Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Topeee along with the Kyndas, can receive target data from extremely difficult. The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and data directly from radar and electronic intelligence counter Western attack submarines. Attacks on West- satellites and possibly could use its V/STOL aircraft ern SSBNs would have to be undertaken in their for targeting assistance. The remaining eight missile- worldwide patrol and base areas. The task of counter- equipped ships are destroyers, each armed with four ing attack submarines would be markedly different for missiles that can be fired to a maximum range of about protecting Pact forces in the approaches to the USSR, 45 nm (80 km). on the one hand, and for the protection of Soviet naval operations in more distant waters, on the other. 1.24. Other Soviet surface combatants opposite NATO which are equipped with antiship cruise mis- ses lude 14 Nanuchka-class and about 75 Osa-classcapabilities on the whole ar extremely limited. The crucial Soviet shortcomings are missile patrol boats. The former are fitted with six 60- lack of long-range submarine detection devices, the nm (110-km) SS-N-9 missiles, while the Osa units have high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative four 19-nm (35-km) SS-N-2b or 45-nm (83-km) to those of the West, and the lack of seaborne tactical SS-N-2c missiles each. Except for the SS-N-2 series, all air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces. current Soviet antiship cruise missiles are believed Nonetheless, virtually all modern Soviet surface com- capable of carrying a nuclear or a conventional batants carry ASW weapons and sensors, and large warhead. numbers of Soviet aircraft and helicopters are fitted 125. Although the Soviets have a large inventory of for ASW operations. ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of conducting attacks on NATO ships, the successful accomplishment 129. The forces opposite NATO which are most of such strikes under wartime situations depends on a capable of ASW operations beyond coastal waters variety of factors. Among the most significant are: the include about 50 Soviet principal surface combatants," effectiveness of Soviet ocean surveillance and elec- 30 nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, and tronic warfare, the number of launch platforms avail- about 45 fixed-wing ASW aircraft. The 16 ships with able for antiship use, the achievement of strategic or helicopters (those of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and tactical surprise, and whether nuclear weapons are Kresta-II classes) and the Krivak frigates are equipped used by the Soviets or NATO. With accurate targeting with long-range (15 to 30 nm, or 28 to 56 km) ASW and the use of nuclear weapons in surprise attacks, the weapons. Only the Kiev- and Moskva-class units com- Soviet naval forces normally deployed in peacetime bine these features with a long-range (typically less would constitute a severe threat to NATO carriers and than 10 nm) active sonar and more than one helicop- amphibious task groups in European waters. Timely ter. Soviet ASW helicopters, however, are limited in warning of a Soviet attack, however, would allow their ASW operations at night and in bad weather. NATO task forces to take action which could enhance their survivability. 130. The V-class nuclear-powered attack subma- rines, of which 19 are in the Northern Fleet, are the 126. The surface-to-air missile systems aboard some most capable Soviet submarines for ASW. 75 Soviet principal surface combatants can also be used against surface ships. The most capable of these systems is the SA-N-3, which has an operational range of 10 to 20 nm (18 to 37 kin) in an antiship mode and may have a nuclear as well as a conventional warhead. This system is installed in the Soviet western fleets' 16 units of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and Kresta-II classes, probably with magazine capacities of either 48 or 72 missiles. In addition, the ASW homing torpedo pay- load of the SS-N-14 cruise missile could be used against surface ships, but we consider this unlikely. 131. The Soviet medium- and long-range airborne ASW capability consists of IL-38 May and TU-142 Antisubmarine Warfare Capabilities Bear F aircraft, which are equipped with sonobuoys 127. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the Pact's " Ships of the Kiev, Moskva, Kresta-II, Kara, Kashin, Mod- antisubmarine warfare tasks would be varied and Kashin, and Krivak classes. 11-39 o _~~e
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.