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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Topeee
along with the Kyndas, can receive target data from extremely difficult. The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and
data directly from radar and electronic intelligence counter Western attack submarines. Attacks on West-
satellites and possibly could use its V/STOL aircraft ern SSBNs would have to be undertaken in their
for targeting assistance. The remaining eight missile- worldwide patrol and base areas. The task of counter-
equipped ships are destroyers, each armed with four ing attack submarines would be markedly different for
missiles that can be fired to a maximum range of about protecting Pact forces in the approaches to the USSR,
45 nm (80 km). on the one hand, and for the protection of Soviet naval
operations in more distant waters, on the other.
1.24. Other Soviet surface combatants opposite
NATO which are equipped with antiship cruise mis-
ses lude 14 Nanuchka-class and about 75 Osa-classcapabilities on the whole ar extremely limited. The crucial Soviet shortcomings are
missile patrol boats. The former are fitted with six 60- lack of long-range submarine detection devices, the
nm (110-km) SS-N-9 missiles, while the Osa units have high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative
four 19-nm (35-km) SS-N-2b or 45-nm (83-km) to those of the West, and the lack of seaborne tactical
SS-N-2c missiles each. Except for the SS-N-2 series, all air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces.
current Soviet antiship cruise missiles are believed Nonetheless, virtually all modern Soviet surface com-
capable of carrying a nuclear or a conventional batants carry ASW weapons and sensors, and large
warhead. numbers of Soviet aircraft and helicopters are fitted
125. Although the Soviets have a large inventory of for ASW operations.
ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of conducting
attacks on NATO ships, the successful accomplishment 129. The forces opposite NATO which are most
of such strikes under wartime situations depends on a capable of ASW operations beyond coastal waters
variety of factors. Among the most significant are: the include about 50 Soviet principal surface combatants,"
effectiveness of Soviet ocean surveillance and elec- 30 nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, and
tronic warfare, the number of launch platforms avail- about 45 fixed-wing ASW aircraft. The 16 ships with
able for antiship use, the achievement of strategic or helicopters (those of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and
tactical surprise, and whether nuclear weapons are Kresta-II classes) and the Krivak frigates are equipped
used by the Soviets or NATO. With accurate targeting with long-range (15 to 30 nm, or 28 to 56 km) ASW
and the use of nuclear weapons in surprise attacks, the weapons. Only the Kiev- and Moskva-class units com-
Soviet naval forces normally deployed in peacetime bine these features with a long-range (typically less
would constitute a severe threat to NATO carriers and than 10 nm) active sonar and more than one helicop-
amphibious task groups in European waters. Timely ter. Soviet ASW helicopters, however, are limited in
warning of a Soviet attack, however, would allow their ASW operations at night and in bad weather.
NATO task forces to take action which could enhance
their survivability. 130. The V-class nuclear-powered attack subma-
rines, of which 19 are in the Northern Fleet, are the
126. The surface-to-air missile systems aboard some most capable Soviet submarines for ASW.
75 Soviet principal surface combatants can also be
used against surface ships. The most capable of these
systems is the SA-N-3, which has an operational range
of 10 to 20 nm (18 to 37 kin) in an antiship mode and
may have a nuclear as well as a conventional warhead.
This system is installed in the Soviet western fleets' 16
units of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and Kresta-II classes,
probably with magazine capacities of either 48 or 72
missiles. In addition, the ASW homing torpedo pay-
load of the SS-N-14 cruise missile could be used
against surface ships, but we consider this unlikely. 131. The Soviet medium- and long-range airborne
ASW capability consists of IL-38 May and TU-142
Antisubmarine Warfare Capabilities Bear F aircraft, which are equipped with sonobuoys
127. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the Pact's " Ships of the Kiev, Moskva, Kresta-II, Kara, Kashin, Mod-
antisubmarine warfare tasks would be varied and Kashin, and Krivak classes.
11-39
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.