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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top
defenses and attacking targets in the open ocean than aircraft, which improve their overall capabilities
does the Badger. Also, it is far more capable than the against NATO naval surface forces. There is insuffi-
Badger of crossing potentially hostile land areas, such cient evidence to judge how the Soviets would use
as Turkey and Greece, and operating over the either of these aircraft against ships at sea or how
Mediterranean. effective they might be in wartime. Most Forger
training thus far has been of the kind useful for attacks
121. In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of which
siderations probably would tend to dictate the use of are hased in the Baltic, are probably intended for
Backfires for strikes against important NATO warships ground attack in support of amphibious operations and
in certain key areas. These areas would include the antiship attacks.
North Atlantic at least as far south as the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (G-l-UK) gap, the North 123. The three Soviet western fleets have 14 princi-
Sea, and the Mediterranean. The operational con- pal surface combatant ships armed with antiship
straints tending to limit the use of Backfires include cruise missiles. (See figure II-23.) Six of these ships
mission planning allowances for combat maneuvering' have long-range (160 to 300 nm, or 300 to 555 km)
and requirements for routing around and penetrating missiles, including the Kiev aircraft carrier, with an
NATO air defenses. Aerial refueling could add flexi- estimated 24 SS-N-12s; two Kynda cruisers, with 16
bility for the employment of Backfires, however. SS-N-3b's each; and three Kresta-I cruisers, with four
122. The Soviet naval air forces opposite NATO SS-N-3b's each. To fire these missiles accurately to
have in the past few years added some 40 shore-based their maximum range requires that these ships obtain
SU-17 Fitter C/D and some 35 carrier-based YAK-36 external targeting support. For this purpose, the Kiev
Forger V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) and the Kresta-Is carry reconnaissance helicopters and,
Nominal Flight Profiles of Soviet Air-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-22b
Altitude (m)
25,000
AS 4 AS ,6
20,000 A 3
15,000
10,000
5,000 -S 5
AS--
650 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Range (km) Target
Sec
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- 11-37
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.