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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80 to about
such as ports, and which has a range of 450 nm (830 200 nm (145 to 360 km). There are also about 40
km). TU-22 Blinder A's which could be used for bombing
118. In addition to cruise-missile submarines, the and mining. The naval Badgers, which first entered
Soviet western fleets include 30 nuclear-powered and service in 1957, are relatively large and slow moving
sovet weston rngfleets inc e 3,a n clss e-powere d by current standards. They are highly vulnerable tosome 59 long-ranige I-, Z-, arid T-class diesel-powered mdr i eesssc stoeo eldfne
attack submarines. Most Soviet nuclear attack subma- nodern air defenses such as those of well-defended
rines are fast-27 to 32 knots-and, despite relatively- aircraft carrier task groups. Improvements in their
missile and electronic warfare systems, however, have
high noise radiation, could be effective in antiship maintained them as firstline strike aircraft.
operations. Soviet long-range diesel submarines are
much slower than the nuclear units. They are particu- 120. The introduction of some 40 Backfire bombers
larly susceptible to detection when snorkeling, but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for extended periods. In addition has significantly improved the strike capability of the.
there are medium- and short-range diesel units which Soviet Navy against NATO~surface forces." Because of
would likely be employed in areas closer to the Soviet the modern, higher speed air-to-surface missile it
Union. carries, its variable flight profiles, its maneuverability,
1.19. The Soviet Navy has some 215 missile- and its high-speed capabilities, the Backfire has a
.higher probability of penetrating NATO naval air
equipped bomber aircraft opposite NATO for antiship
attacks. (See figure II-22.) They include about 175 See NIE 11-3/8-78 and section D of this chapter (paragraph
TU-16 Badgers and some 40 Backfires. These aircraft 179 and figure I1-30) for details of the differing agency estimates
carry four types of missiles with various flight profiles of the Backfire's capabilities.
Soviet Naval Strike Aircraft Figure 11-22a
TU-16 Badger TU-22 Blinder Backfire
C C (modified) G
Year operational 1960 1971 1965 1962 1974
Payload One AS-2 Two AS-5 Two AS-5 3,000 kilograms
or or (bombs)
two AS-6 two AS-6
Maximum 1,450 1,150 1,150 , 1,740 See figure Il-30b for differing
unrefu radiu (nm)0 1,15agency assessments of theunrefueled radius (nm) Backfire's performance
characteristics.
Maximum radius with 2,050 1,850 1,850 2,350
prestrike refueling (nm)
579026 minc
11-36

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.