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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80 to about
such as ports, and which has a range of 450 nm (830 200 nm (145 to 360 km). There are also about 40
km). TU-22 Blinder A's which could be used for bombing
118. In addition to cruise-missile submarines, the and mining. The naval Badgers, which first entered
Soviet western fleets include 30 nuclear-powered and service in 1957, are relatively large and slow moving
sovet weston rngfleets inc e 3,a n clss e-powere d by current standards. They are highly vulnerable tosome 59 long-ranige I-, Z-, arid T-class diesel-powered mdr i eesssc stoeo eldfne
attack submarines. Most Soviet nuclear attack subma- nodern air defenses such as those of well-defended
rines are fast-27 to 32 knots-and, despite relatively- aircraft carrier task groups. Improvements in their
missile and electronic warfare systems, however, have
high noise radiation, could be effective in antiship maintained them as firstline strike aircraft.
operations. Soviet long-range diesel submarines are
much slower than the nuclear units. They are particu- 120. The introduction of some 40 Backfire bombers
larly susceptible to detection when snorkeling, but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for extended periods. In addition has significantly improved the strike capability of the.
there are medium- and short-range diesel units which Soviet Navy against NATO~surface forces." Because of
would likely be employed in areas closer to the Soviet the modern, higher speed air-to-surface missile it
Union. carries, its variable flight profiles, its maneuverability,
1.19. The Soviet Navy has some 215 missile- and its high-speed capabilities, the Backfire has a
.higher probability of penetrating NATO naval air
equipped bomber aircraft opposite NATO for antiship
attacks. (See figure II-22.) They include about 175 See NIE 11-3/8-78 and section D of this chapter (paragraph
TU-16 Badgers and some 40 Backfires. These aircraft 179 and figure I1-30) for details of the differing agency estimates
carry four types of missiles with various flight profiles of the Backfire's capabilities.
Soviet Naval Strike Aircraft Figure 11-22a
TU-16 Badger TU-22 Blinder Backfire
C C (modified) G
Year operational 1960 1971 1965 1962 1974
Payload One AS-2 Two AS-5 Two AS-5 3,000 kilograms
or or (bombs)
two AS-6 two AS-6
Maximum 1,450 1,150 1,150 , 1,740 See figure Il-30b for differing
unrefu radiu (nm)0 1,15agency assessments of theunrefueled radius (nm) Backfire's performance
characteristics.
Maximum radius with 2,050 1,850 1,850 2,350
prestrike refueling (nm)
579026 minc
11-36

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.