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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80 to about
such as ports, and which has a range of 450 nm (830 200 nm (145 to 360 km). There are also about 40
km). TU-22 Blinder A's which could be used for bombing
118. In addition to cruise-missile submarines, the and mining. The naval Badgers, which first entered
Soviet western fleets include 30 nuclear-powered and service in 1957, are relatively large and slow moving
sovet weston rngfleets inc e 3,a n clss e-powere d by current standards. They are highly vulnerable tosome 59 long-ranige I-, Z-, arid T-class diesel-powered mdr i eesssc stoeo eldfne
attack submarines. Most Soviet nuclear attack subma- nodern air defenses such as those of well-defended
rines are fast-27 to 32 knots-and, despite relatively- aircraft carrier task groups. Improvements in their
missile and electronic warfare systems, however, have
high noise radiation, could be effective in antiship maintained them as firstline strike aircraft.
operations. Soviet long-range diesel submarines are
much slower than the nuclear units. They are particu- 120. The introduction of some 40 Backfire bombers
larly susceptible to detection when snorkeling, but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for extended periods. In addition has significantly improved the strike capability of the.
there are medium- and short-range diesel units which Soviet Navy against NATO~surface forces." Because of
would likely be employed in areas closer to the Soviet the modern, higher speed air-to-surface missile it
Union. carries, its variable flight profiles, its maneuverability,
1.19. The Soviet Navy has some 215 missile- and its high-speed capabilities, the Backfire has a
.higher probability of penetrating NATO naval air
equipped bomber aircraft opposite NATO for antiship
attacks. (See figure II-22.) They include about 175 See NIE 11-3/8-78 and section D of this chapter (paragraph
TU-16 Badgers and some 40 Backfires. These aircraft 179 and figure I1-30) for details of the differing agency estimates
carry four types of missiles with various flight profiles of the Backfire's capabilities.
Soviet Naval Strike Aircraft Figure 11-22a
TU-16 Badger TU-22 Blinder Backfire
C C (modified) G
Year operational 1960 1971 1965 1962 1974
Payload One AS-2 Two AS-5 Two AS-5 3,000 kilograms
or or (bombs)
two AS-6 two AS-6
Maximum 1,450 1,150 1,150 , 1,740 See figure Il-30b for differing
unrefu radiu (nm)0 1,15agency assessments of theunrefueled radius (nm) Backfire's performance
characteristics.
Maximum radius with 2,050 1,850 1,850 2,350
prestrike refueling (nm)
579026 minc
11-36

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.