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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“Mission Control”29 pages

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed range (km)* Guidance Launch platform IOC
SS-N-2a 515 HE Mach 0.9 35-40 Radar or IR Osa and Komar 1959
PTG
SS-N-2b 515 HE Mach 0.9 35-40 Radar or IR Osa PTG 1964
SS-N-2c 330 HE Mach 0.9 83 Radar or IR Osa PTG 1975
Mod Kildin DD
Mod Kashin DDG
SS-N-3a 1,000 HE Mach 1.4 410 Radar 1 SSG 1962
or nuclear E-Il SSGN
SS-N-3b Mod 1 1,000 HE Mach 1.5 410 Radar Kynda CG 1962
The coastal defense version of this or nuclear Kresta I CG
missile is called the SS-C-1b.
SS-N-3b Mod 2 1,000 HE Mach 1.5 410 Radar Kresta I CG 1977
or nuclear
SS-N-3c Nuclear Mach 1.2 830 Autopilot/inertial W SSG 1962
E-l SSGN (poss)
J SSG (poss)
SS-N-7 500 HE Mach 0.9 65 Radar C-I SSGN 1968
or nuclear C-IISSGN
SS-N-9 500 HE Mach 0.9 110 Radar and IR Nanuchka PGG 1971
or nuclear Sarancha PGGH
LD C-Il SSGN
P SSGN
SS-N-12 1,000 HE Mach 2.4 550 Radar E-ll SSGN 1976
or nuclear Kiev CVSG
SS-N-14 E45-70A Mach 0.9 55 Active/passive Krivak FFG 1974
Data insufficient for drawing. or acoustic Kresta II CG
E45-75A Kara CG
Torpedo
'This is the maximum distance that the missile can travel and still
effectively engage a target. In many cases, the missiles have a
greater propulsion range but are not considered effective in an
antiship role.
579024 .s cm
11-34
lop rt

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.