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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“The Advance”37 pages

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
TopSert
ions task forces would be accomplished primarily by areas of NATO air superiority. A pair of radar satel-
land-based electronic surveillance of the task force's lites could, under optimum conditions, provide cover-
high-frequency radio transmissions supported by satel- age of 60 to 80 percent of the likely carrier and
lites for electronic intercept and radar reconnaissance. amphibious task force transit lanes in the Atlantic in a
This type of surveillance would be supplemented by clay, but another four days would be needed to
aircraft, submarine, and surface ship reconnaissance provide full coverage. Soviet capabilities to estimate
for both detection and positive identification. the disposition of NATO surface forces could be
progressively degraded by the use of deception tech-
116. The major weakness of the Soviet ocean sur- niques against radar satellites, combined with
veillance system is its heavy reliance on electronic EMCON.
emissions from potential targets. When NATO forces 117. The Soviets have some 43 antiship cruise mis-
implement emission control (EMCON) conditions, ile submarines (see figure 11-20) in their western fleets
which occur during NATO exercises, Soviet surveil- for deployment in the Atlantic and European theater
lance capabilities are impaired, sometimes drastically. aeFour ine-lanc ant rue me
area. Four submarine-launched antiship ciriise missile
If EMCON conditions were imposed in wartime, (ASCM) systems (see figure 11-21), are operational,
Soviet naval and civilian maritime assets and radar each capable of delivering either conventional or
satellites probably would be able to provide adequate nuclear warheads. Deployed units probably carry an
data only on Western surface forces previously located equal mix of high-explosive and nuclear warheads.
or those within striking range of Warsaw Pact coun- They probably also carry at least two nuclear torpe-
tries. Elsewhere, large NATO ships would probably be does. The ASCM-equipped submarines include:
less vulnerable to detection because of the limitations
of the radar satellites and the nearly impossible task of - Seven C-I and three C-II-class nuclear-powered
providing surveillance by surface ships and aircraft in units, each of which can fire eight antiship
Selected Newer Soviet General Purpose Submarines Figure 11-20
Propulsion/max.
submerged speed
Year operational (knots) Armament
C-Il cruise missile submarine 1974 Nuclear/23 SS-N-9 antiship cruise missile
Torpedoes: ASW and antiship
V-Il attack submarine 1973 Nuclear/31 SS-N-15 ASW missile
Torpedoes: ASW and antiship
A attack submarine 1978 Nuclear/27+ Possible ASW missile
Torpedoes
T attack submarine 1973 Diesel/16 Possible ASW missile
Torpedoes
579023 -s cu
11-33
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.