Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”5 pages
TopSert ions task forces would be accomplished primarily by areas of NATO air superiority. A pair of radar satel- land-based electronic surveillance of the task force's lites could, under optimum conditions, provide cover- high-frequency radio transmissions supported by satel- age of 60 to 80 percent of the likely carrier and lites for electronic intercept and radar reconnaissance. amphibious task force transit lanes in the Atlantic in a This type of surveillance would be supplemented by clay, but another four days would be needed to aircraft, submarine, and surface ship reconnaissance provide full coverage. Soviet capabilities to estimate for both detection and positive identification. the disposition of NATO surface forces could be progressively degraded by the use of deception tech- 116. The major weakness of the Soviet ocean sur- niques against radar satellites, combined with veillance system is its heavy reliance on electronic EMCON. emissions from potential targets. When NATO forces 117. The Soviets have some 43 antiship cruise mis- implement emission control (EMCON) conditions, ile submarines (see figure 11-20) in their western fleets which occur during NATO exercises, Soviet surveil- for deployment in the Atlantic and European theater lance capabilities are impaired, sometimes drastically. aeFour ine-lanc ant rue me area. Four submarine-launched antiship ciriise missile If EMCON conditions were imposed in wartime, (ASCM) systems (see figure 11-21), are operational, Soviet naval and civilian maritime assets and radar each capable of delivering either conventional or satellites probably would be able to provide adequate nuclear warheads. Deployed units probably carry an data only on Western surface forces previously located equal mix of high-explosive and nuclear warheads. or those within striking range of Warsaw Pact coun- They probably also carry at least two nuclear torpe- tries. Elsewhere, large NATO ships would probably be does. The ASCM-equipped submarines include: less vulnerable to detection because of the limitations of the radar satellites and the nearly impossible task of - Seven C-I and three C-II-class nuclear-powered providing surveillance by surface ships and aircraft in units, each of which can fire eight antiship Selected Newer Soviet General Purpose Submarines Figure 11-20 Propulsion/max. submerged speed Year operational (knots) Armament C-Il cruise missile submarine 1974 Nuclear/23 SS-N-9 antiship cruise missile Torpedoes: ASW and antiship V-Il attack submarine 1973 Nuclear/31 SS-N-15 ASW missile Torpedoes: ASW and antiship A attack submarine 1978 Nuclear/27+ Possible ASW missile Torpedoes T attack submarine 1973 Diesel/16 Possible ASW missile Torpedoes 579023 -s cu 11-33 ept
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.