Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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number from a pool of 300,000 reservists released problems are unavailable, but Soviet naval authorities
from active duty within the previous five years. Other appear to be concerned. These problems are most
reservists would be called up to fill out the naval evident among enlisted noncareerists-who account
support establishment bu we do not know the gross for about 95 percent of enlisted personnel-but are
number required or the functional skills needed by found among only a relatively small proportion of
type and number. officers and enlisted career personnel. The difficulties
are brought out in reports concerning alcoholism, poor
109. The growing complexity of naval weapon sys- performance aboard ship, absences without leave,
tens demands greater technical expertise in operation- disciplinary infractions, and even a mutiny aboard a
and maintenance. The Soviets, to a much greater destroyer. These problems, which are reflections of
extent than is normal in Western navies, rely on Soviet society as a whole, could have an adverse
officers and warrant officers to operate, maintain, and
repar teircomlexequpmen. Svie naal ffiers impact upon peacetime training and materiel readi-repair their complex equipment. Soviet naval officers ness programs and thus would explain the concern of
have a strong technical background, acquired during senior naval authorities. We doubt, however, that
the five years they spend at officer training schools, these problems would prevail during wartime to an
most of which provide engineering degrees. Major extent which would affect ship operations or crew
shortcomings of the Soviet Navy's training systern' performance, because in wartime most of the motiva-
however, include its overemphasis on narrow special- tional and disciplinary problems would disappear.
ization and its apparent failure to instill the qualities
of initiative and adaptability essential to effective Major Wartime Tasks
leadership at sea. These weaknesses could constitute a
disadvantage under combat conditions. 113. The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
110. The Soviets apparently lack sufficient enlisted in waters from which NATO's sea-based air and
personnel technically qualified to handle their increas- ballistic missile strike and amphibious projection
ingly complex equipment. A low reenlistment rate has forces can reach the Soviet Union, to support and
tended to exacerbate this deficiency. The recent exter- protect Soviet ballistic missile submarines, to exercise
sion of shipboard duty from 18 months to two years sea denial in the sea lanes necessary for resupply and
for those enlisted personnel with higher education reinforcement of Europe from the United States, and
appears to be an attempt to reduce shortages of to project power ashore in support of Pact ground
technically skilled personnel. In an effort to compen- forces. Although the relative emphasis that would be
sate for these shortages, the Soviet Navy periodically placed on each of these missions in a conflict would
has engaged in concentrated campaigns to encourage depend upon the way hostilities were initiated and the
and promote cross-training of enlisted personnel and course of the war, the Soviets in their major exercises
officers in a second specialty. There is little evidence have focused on ASW and attacks on carriers, cruisers,
that such campaigns have had a lasting effect. and amphibious task forces.
111. Shipboard training of new sailors revolves
around the semiannual conscription cycles, each of
which appears to account for about a 15-percent 114. Soviet Navy resources capable of acting to
turnover of personnel. This training is based on an counter NATO's surface naval forces include missile-
annual cycle, much of which is aimed at developing equipped bombers, submarines, and surface combat-
individual ship proficiency and readiness. The high ants which are supported by ocean surveillance sys-
turnover of enlisted conscripts is partially offset by the tems, including ELINT and radar satellites and air-
long tenure of career personnel. It is not uncommon, craft, for detecting, identifying, and tracking potential
for example, for the latter to spend five to 10 years surface targets. These surveillance systems are cen-
aboard the same ship. Although shipboard training has trally controlled from Navy and General Staff head-
been improving, it continues to be excessively struc- quarters in Moscow, and information derived from
tured and stereotyped. We are uncertain whether these systems is made available to the fleets.
these factors would seriously degrade cobat 115. Major exercises since 1970 have demonstrated
the Soviet approach to, and capabilities for, a large
112. There is evidence of morale and disciplinary ocean surveillance operation coordinated with strike
problems among Soviet naval personnel. As with the activities in various areas. They indicate that the
ground forces, statistics pertaining to the scope of these detection and tracking of NATO carriers and amphib-
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