Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top etE combat readiness in several hours and a few alert which a covert transition would occur, this informa- aircraft could react in 30 to 40 minutes. tion reflects Soviet expectations of achieving full com- 103. Table UI-8 reflects the normal peacetime status bat readiness for the Soviet fleets. of the Soviet naval units. During an extended period of 105. In addition to the active forces, the Soviets tension, the number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants and 100 notice would be increased, while training and main- submarines in a reserve status in the western fleet tenance probably would be accelerated to improve areas. These units differ widely in levels of mainte- combat effectiveness. Many of the combatants under- nance and readiness, ranging from complete preserva- going minor repair or in refresher training following tion and storage to at least external maintenance and repairs probably could regain an acceptable level of upkeep. Some units receive periodic checks of systems, combat readiness within a week or two and most could including propulsion systems, and a few W-class sub- be made combat ready within two months. The rest of marines and Skoryy-class destroyers are rotated in and the foreign long-term overhaul or modification would out of the active force. be unavailable for combat operations even with sev- eralmonts' pepartion106. We have little information concerning the eral months' preparation. overall readiness of this reserve fleet. The apparent wide disparity of maintenance status, however, india cates that the time required to place these units in combat operation would vary. One view "5 in the Intelligence Community holds that six to 10 subma- rines could be brought to operational status in 30 days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. Another view s is that virtually no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought to combat readiness in less than 90 days. As for the reserve surface combat- ants, all agree that a significant number of these probably could not be brought to sufficient combat readiness rapidly enough to have an active role in the course of combat operations. 107. The Soviet Navy draws information on surface ship locations from a large and comprehensive ocean surveillance system, including HF/DF (high-fre- cuency/direction-finding) stations, ELINT (electronic Table II-8 intelligence) and radar satellites, reconnaissance air- Normal Peacetime Status of Soviet Naval Forces craft, intelligence collection ships, and civilian mari- Percent of time assets. It provides intelligence on naval move- Activity Force* Status ments and deployments worldwide. Command and --- - - ---- control systems and procedures have been expanded Attack Submarines: and improved to allow control of operating forces Major Overhaul 20 Unavailable Minor Repair 20 Reduced Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command authorities afloat. 'Deployed 20 At Sea Principal Surface Combatants Manpower, Personnel, and Training Major Overhaul 20-25 Unavailable Minor Repair or Refresher 108. Current Soviet naval personnel strengths are Training 25-30 Reduced Readiness adequate to meet peacetime requirements. Upon Home waters 35-40 Operable mobilization, fewer than 50,000 reservists would be t eployed 10-15 At Sea ___needed to provide full complements for all ships, both * Percentages are approximate, based on varying amounts of data active and reserve. The Soviets can easily mobilize this for respective force components. Available data are more extensive for the submarine force than for the surface fleet and therefore The holders of this view are Director, Defense Intelligence probably more accurate. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. T he holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency. 11-31 ~STo e4
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.