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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top etE
combat readiness in several hours and a few alert which a covert transition would occur, this informa-
aircraft could react in 30 to 40 minutes. tion reflects Soviet expectations of achieving full com-
103. Table UI-8 reflects the normal peacetime status bat readiness for the Soviet fleets.
of the Soviet naval units. During an extended period of 105. In addition to the active forces, the Soviets
tension, the number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants and 100
notice would be increased, while training and main- submarines in a reserve status in the western fleet
tenance probably would be accelerated to improve areas. These units differ widely in levels of mainte-
combat effectiveness. Many of the combatants under- nance and readiness, ranging from complete preserva-
going minor repair or in refresher training following tion and storage to at least external maintenance and
repairs probably could regain an acceptable level of upkeep. Some units receive periodic checks of systems,
combat readiness within a week or two and most could including propulsion systems, and a few W-class sub-
be made combat ready within two months. The rest of marines and Skoryy-class destroyers are rotated in and
the foreign long-term overhaul or modification would out of the active force.
be unavailable for combat operations even with sev-
eralmonts' pepartion106. We have little information concerning the
eral months' preparation. overall readiness of this reserve fleet. The apparent
wide disparity of maintenance status, however, india
cates that the time required to place these units in
combat operation would vary. One view "5 in the
Intelligence Community holds that six to 10 subma-
rines could be brought to operational status in 30 days
and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. Another
view s is that virtually no reserve submarines with
their crews could be brought to combat readiness in
less than 90 days. As for the reserve surface combat-
ants, all agree that a significant number of these
probably could not be brought to sufficient combat
readiness rapidly enough to have an active role in the
course of combat operations.
107. The Soviet Navy draws information on surface
ship locations from a large and comprehensive ocean
surveillance system, including HF/DF (high-fre-
cuency/direction-finding) stations, ELINT (electronic
Table II-8 intelligence) and radar satellites, reconnaissance air-
Normal Peacetime Status of Soviet Naval Forces craft, intelligence collection ships, and civilian mari-
Percent of time assets. It provides intelligence on naval move-
Activity Force* Status ments and deployments worldwide. Command and
--- - - ---- control systems and procedures have been expanded
Attack Submarines: and improved to allow control of operating forces
Major Overhaul 20 Unavailable
Minor Repair 20 Reduced Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet
Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command authorities afloat.
'Deployed 20 At Sea
Principal Surface Combatants Manpower, Personnel, and Training
Major Overhaul 20-25 Unavailable
Minor Repair or Refresher 108. Current Soviet naval personnel strengths are
Training 25-30 Reduced Readiness adequate to meet peacetime requirements. Upon
Home waters 35-40 Operable mobilization, fewer than 50,000 reservists would be
t eployed 10-15 At Sea ___needed to provide full complements for all ships, both
* Percentages are approximate, based on varying amounts of data active and reserve. The Soviets can easily mobilize this
for respective force components. Available data are more extensive
for the submarine force than for the surface fleet and therefore The holders of this view are Director, Defense Intelligence
probably more accurate. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
T he holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.
11-31
~STo e4

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.