“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Top etE
combat readiness in several hours and a few alert which a covert transition would occur, this informa-
aircraft could react in 30 to 40 minutes. tion reflects Soviet expectations of achieving full com-
103. Table UI-8 reflects the normal peacetime status bat readiness for the Soviet fleets.
of the Soviet naval units. During an extended period of 105. In addition to the active forces, the Soviets
tension, the number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants and 100
notice would be increased, while training and main- submarines in a reserve status in the western fleet
tenance probably would be accelerated to improve areas. These units differ widely in levels of mainte-
combat effectiveness. Many of the combatants under- nance and readiness, ranging from complete preserva-
going minor repair or in refresher training following tion and storage to at least external maintenance and
repairs probably could regain an acceptable level of upkeep. Some units receive periodic checks of systems,
combat readiness within a week or two and most could including propulsion systems, and a few W-class sub-
be made combat ready within two months. The rest of marines and Skoryy-class destroyers are rotated in and
the foreign long-term overhaul or modification would out of the active force.
be unavailable for combat operations even with sev-
eralmonts' pepartion106. We have little information concerning the
eral months' preparation. overall readiness of this reserve fleet. The apparent
wide disparity of maintenance status, however, india
cates that the time required to place these units in
combat operation would vary. One view "5 in the
Intelligence Community holds that six to 10 subma-
rines could be brought to operational status in 30 days
and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. Another
view s is that virtually no reserve submarines with
their crews could be brought to combat readiness in
less than 90 days. As for the reserve surface combat-
ants, all agree that a significant number of these
probably could not be brought to sufficient combat
readiness rapidly enough to have an active role in the
course of combat operations.
107. The Soviet Navy draws information on surface
ship locations from a large and comprehensive ocean
surveillance system, including HF/DF (high-fre-
cuency/direction-finding) stations, ELINT (electronic
Table II-8 intelligence) and radar satellites, reconnaissance air-
Normal Peacetime Status of Soviet Naval Forces craft, intelligence collection ships, and civilian mari-
Percent of time assets. It provides intelligence on naval move-
Activity Force* Status ments and deployments worldwide. Command and
--- - - ---- control systems and procedures have been expanded
Attack Submarines: and improved to allow control of operating forces
Major Overhaul 20 Unavailable
Minor Repair 20 Reduced Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet
Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command authorities afloat.
'Deployed 20 At Sea
Principal Surface Combatants Manpower, Personnel, and Training
Major Overhaul 20-25 Unavailable
Minor Repair or Refresher 108. Current Soviet naval personnel strengths are
Training 25-30 Reduced Readiness adequate to meet peacetime requirements. Upon
Home waters 35-40 Operable mobilization, fewer than 50,000 reservists would be
t eployed 10-15 At Sea ___needed to provide full complements for all ships, both
* Percentages are approximate, based on varying amounts of data active and reserve. The Soviets can easily mobilize this
for respective force components. Available data are more extensive
for the submarine force than for the surface fleet and therefore The holders of this view are Director, Defense Intelligence
probably more accurate. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
T he holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.
11-31
~STo e4