Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
may also have recently introduced an improved series equipment with some transport, supplies, and support of cluster bombs and are believed to be developing elements. With its large force of cargo-configured precision guided bombs. transport aircraft, VTA is well equipped to transport equipment and supplies, especially the types of equip- Military Transport Aviation ment found in Pact airborne units. A factor which 93. The primary mission of VTA is to lift Soviet limits Soviet air transport capabilities is the low ratio airborne forces but other missions include the move- of aircrews to operational aircraft (1.3 to 1). With such ment of troops, equipment, supplies, and nuclear a ratio, crew fatigue becomes a critical factor during weapons. A mission which has been expanded recently sustained operations. is the delivery of economic and military assistance 97. With nearly all VTA airlift assets and Soviet materiel to Soviet client states in the Third World. airborne divisions deployed in the western USSR, VTA operates some 665 medium and heavy transport VTA's airborne assault potential is clearly targeted aircraft, of which approximately 555 are the medium- toward Central Europe and NATO's flanks. Numerous range AN-12 Cub. About 50 AN-22 Cock long-range airfields in nearby Warsaw Pact countries would be transports (which can carry all ground force divisional available for recovery and servicing, adequate fighter equipment) and 60 of the new IL-76 Candid long- coverage is close at hand, and VTA crews are rela- range transports are also in the inventory. (See figure tively familiar with the area. Il-17.) Most of these aircraft are based in the western USSR. 98. Forty additional AN-12 Cubs, which are as- signed to a VTA special purpose regiment, have been 94. Civil aircraft from Aeroflot provide supplemen- modified as electronic warfare platforms. These air- tal support to VTA and include about 1,300 medium- craft are assigned the mission of EW support of and long-range transports. These aircraft are con- paradrop operations of the airborne forces as well as figured primarily for personnel or light cargo airlift, standoff EW support for fighter and bomber aircraft. but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs are used to provide an equipment. Aeroflot aircraft transport some 100,000 EW environment for training activities of Soviet and personnel over a period of about three to four weeks Warsaw Pact air defense forces. during the semiannual rotation of troops for the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe. NSWP National Air Defense Forces " 95. Military Transport Aviation devotes consider- 99. Each of the NSWP countries maintains a na- able training time to its primary mission of transport-. tional air defense force consisting of fighter-intercep- ing airborne assault troops, including night drops, close tor units, surface-to-air missile units, and a radar formation flying, and low-level navigation. We believe network. (See table 11-6.) In effect, these forces consti- that VTA exercises and training activities demonstrate tute a forward extension of Soviet strategic air de- an adequate level of competence to transport airborne fenses. The SAM units are predominantly equipped assault troops but that the success of this mission would with SA-2s, but some countries also have SA-3s. The depend upon a favorable air environment. interceptor components number about 1,200 fighter 96. The movement of all unit equipment and the aircraft, which, in addition to their primary mission of 7,300 personnel assigned to an airborne division would defense of the national airspace, could provide limited sup~port to ground forces.require the entire lift capacity of VTA. Assuming an aircraft serviceability rate of about 85 percent, VTA's total serviceable fleet probably would prove inad- C: Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces equate for a full division lift. In combat operations, however, airborne units would probably leave behind 100. The Soviet Navy has in the past decade or so their administrative personnel and some equipment significantly improved its capability to participate in a such as trucks. We calculate that VTA could lift the Pact-NATO war. In addition to providing support to assault elements of two airborne divisions simul- the Pact's ground forces and defending the Pact's taneously, including combat and combat support maritime frontiers, the Soviet Navy can now under- take combat operations at greater distances from home We also have noted, albeit infrequently, AN-12 Cubs and IL-76 waters. Soviet general purpose naval forces opposite Candids of VTA training in radar-assisted, free-fall bombing, but do - not ascribe major capabilities or wartirme missions to VTA in this " For a discussion of Soviet strategic air defense capabilities, see role. NIE 11-3/8-78. 11-27
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.