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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
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90. A new medium-range air-to-air missile, the ent tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs) have also
AA-7 Apex, evidently is being fielded in both infrared been developed in recent years. One of these, the AS-7
seeking and semiactive versions. (See figure 11-16.) The Kerry, was developed some years ago as a short-range,
missile probably has a limited shootdown capability to beam-riding missile for use on earlier model MIG-21s.
match the limited lookdown, search-and-track features We have evidence, however, that the Fitter C and
of the airborne intercept radar on the Flogger B. In Flogger D are also capable of using a command-
addition, a new short-range, infrared-seeking air-to-air guided variant of the Kerry missile. The other two
missile, the AA-8 Aphid, is in service. This missile is TASMs, the AS-9 and AS-10, are completely new
smaller than earlier missiles, probably is more maneu- missiles. The AS-9 is an antiradiation missile with an
verable, and is estimated to have a launch range of estimated maximum range of 60 nm (10 km). The AS-
0.25 to 5 nautical miles (about 450 to 9,000 meters). 10 is a semiactive laser-guided missile with a maxi-
The Soviets also have fielded the AA-2d (Atoll D), an mum range of approximately 6 nm (11 kin).
infrared homing air-to-air missile which may have an 92. The Soviets have made some advances in
irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their bomb shapes, and in developing
bly better maneuverability. Both the AA-8 and AA-2d retardation devices which allow ordnance to be deliv-
ered in high-speed, low-level flight. A runway-crater-
91. All Pact ground attack aircraft can carry a wide ing bomb was issued in 1974 and is probably able to
range of ground attack weapons, including pods of penetrate about half a meter of reinforced concrete in
57-mm rockets, large unguided rockets, conventional low-altitude delivery. The standard Soviet 250-kg
bombs of up to 500 kilograms, and cluster weapons. In fragmentation bomb has been modified with a tele-
addition, many carry guns and cannons. Three differ- scoping fuse to increase shrapnel effect. The Soviets
Selected Warsaw Pact Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface Missiles Figure Il-16
for Tactical Aircraft
Year operational Guidance Range (nm) Carrier aircraft
Atoll AAM
AA-2b 1960 Infrared 3-4 Fishbed, Flogger B/C/E
AA-2c 1970 Semiactive radar 3-4 Fishbed J/K/L/N, Flogger E
AA-2d 1973 Infrared 4-6 Fishbed L/N, Flogger B
Apex AAM
AA-7a 1974 Semiactive radar 10 Flogger B
AA-7b 1974 Infrared 10 Flogger B
Aphid AAM
AA-8 1975 Infrared 2-3 Fishbed L/N, Flogger B
AS-7 Kerry TASM 1971 Command or 6 Fishbed F, Fitter C/D
beam rider Flogger B/D, Fencer A
AS-9 TASM 1975 Antiradiation homing 27-30 Fitter C/D, Fencer A
AS-10 TASM 1976 Semiactive laser 6-8 Fitter C/D ,Flogger D,
Fencer A
579021 . cu
11-26
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.