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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap-
for radar vectoring of attack aircraft toward the target ons delivery role.
area, after which pilots are responsible for navigation 88. Helicopters. In recent years the Soviets have
to specific targets and their visual identification. Along introduced the MI-24 Hind, the first of their helicop-
the frontline, tactical controllers can hand over control ters designed primarily for ordnance delivery. (See
to ground-based forward air controllers, who would figure II-15.) It offers such advantages over earlier
then provide target-recognition guidance and, if neces- helicopters as improved all-weather capabilities and
sary, target marking. versatility. The Hind also has an air-to-air capability
85. Reconnaissance. In the Soviet view, the most against other helicopters and low, slow-flying fixed-
important function of tactical reconnaissance is to wing aircraft. A variant of the MI-8, the Hip E, has
detect enemy nuclear delivery means to enable accu- been equipped with rocket pods, machineguns, and
rate and timely execution of combat operations against antitank guided missiles.
them. Large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft are 89. Air Munitions. The Soviets are pursuing a
considered necessary to give proper support to offen- vigorous program to increase the effectiveness of their
sive operations. To provide this support, air reconnais~ air munitions to exploit the enhanced capabilities of
sance is conducted both as an integral part of other their newer aircraft. They apparently believe that the
basic air tasks and as a specified mission by special increased maintenance and training requirements gen-
fighter-reconnaissance and bomber-reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to
units. The Soviets believe that a variety of ground and correct the deficiencies of the older, simpler muni-
airborne sensors, together with visual observation, tions. The net effect of these air munition improve-
must be used to provide a multiple-source data base. rnent programs should be to reduce the number of
Improved sensors, including side-looking airborne ra- aircraft required for effective target destruction. The
dar (SLAR) and real-time television data link systems, improved guidance systems and delivery techniques
have been installed in some reconnaissance aircraft. also should increase the survivability of Pact aircraft in
86. Aerial reconnaissance capabilities range from an air conflict.
those provided by visual observation to the supersonic,
high-altitude MIG-25 Foxbat B/D. Reconnaissance Warsaw Pact Ground Figure 11-15
missions are a constant feature of Warsaw Pact exer- Attack Helicopters
cises; every Warsaw Pact aircrew has the responsibility MI-8 Hip E MI-24 Hind D
to report visual sightings. Specialized intelligence col-
lection aircraft are configured for photographic, active -
radar, communications, and electronic intelligence- 0 0
gathering missions. Mobile photo-processing units are
available at most Soviet reconnaissance units in East- Year operational 1977 1976
ern Europe. Although the total number of aircraft
with the primary mission of reconnaissance is known, Length (m) 18.2 17.3
our knowledge of their actual reconnaissance capabili-
ties, especially their timeliness and quality, is poor. Maximum useful 4,500 5,300
The lack of automated equipment or other means for load (kilograms,fuel
timely and accurate location and reporting of mobile and payload)'
or semimobile targets, is believed to be a current
weakness. Maximum combat 95 120
radius* (nm)
87. Most Soviet reconnaissance units have secon-
dary missions and additional combat responsibilities.
For example, MIG-21 Fishbed H units normally de- 'Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with a
vote part of their training to ground attack, and one maximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff.
such unit may also be tasked with air defense. Some
MIG-25 Foxbat B/D aircraft are known to have
practiced supersonic, high-altitude runs which could 52o
be interpreted as simulating weapons delivery, but as
yet this aircraft is not known to carry either nuclear or
11-25
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.