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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap-
for radar vectoring of attack aircraft toward the target ons delivery role.
area, after which pilots are responsible for navigation 88. Helicopters. In recent years the Soviets have
to specific targets and their visual identification. Along introduced the MI-24 Hind, the first of their helicop-
the frontline, tactical controllers can hand over control ters designed primarily for ordnance delivery. (See
to ground-based forward air controllers, who would figure II-15.) It offers such advantages over earlier
then provide target-recognition guidance and, if neces- helicopters as improved all-weather capabilities and
sary, target marking. versatility. The Hind also has an air-to-air capability
85. Reconnaissance. In the Soviet view, the most against other helicopters and low, slow-flying fixed-
important function of tactical reconnaissance is to wing aircraft. A variant of the MI-8, the Hip E, has
detect enemy nuclear delivery means to enable accu- been equipped with rocket pods, machineguns, and
rate and timely execution of combat operations against antitank guided missiles.
them. Large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft are 89. Air Munitions. The Soviets are pursuing a
considered necessary to give proper support to offen- vigorous program to increase the effectiveness of their
sive operations. To provide this support, air reconnais~ air munitions to exploit the enhanced capabilities of
sance is conducted both as an integral part of other their newer aircraft. They apparently believe that the
basic air tasks and as a specified mission by special increased maintenance and training requirements gen-
fighter-reconnaissance and bomber-reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to
units. The Soviets believe that a variety of ground and correct the deficiencies of the older, simpler muni-
airborne sensors, together with visual observation, tions. The net effect of these air munition improve-
must be used to provide a multiple-source data base. rnent programs should be to reduce the number of
Improved sensors, including side-looking airborne ra- aircraft required for effective target destruction. The
dar (SLAR) and real-time television data link systems, improved guidance systems and delivery techniques
have been installed in some reconnaissance aircraft. also should increase the survivability of Pact aircraft in
86. Aerial reconnaissance capabilities range from an air conflict.
those provided by visual observation to the supersonic,
high-altitude MIG-25 Foxbat B/D. Reconnaissance Warsaw Pact Ground Figure 11-15
missions are a constant feature of Warsaw Pact exer- Attack Helicopters
cises; every Warsaw Pact aircrew has the responsibility MI-8 Hip E MI-24 Hind D
to report visual sightings. Specialized intelligence col-
lection aircraft are configured for photographic, active -
radar, communications, and electronic intelligence- 0 0
gathering missions. Mobile photo-processing units are
available at most Soviet reconnaissance units in East- Year operational 1977 1976
ern Europe. Although the total number of aircraft
with the primary mission of reconnaissance is known, Length (m) 18.2 17.3
our knowledge of their actual reconnaissance capabili-
ties, especially their timeliness and quality, is poor. Maximum useful 4,500 5,300
The lack of automated equipment or other means for load (kilograms,fuel
timely and accurate location and reporting of mobile and payload)'
or semimobile targets, is believed to be a current
weakness. Maximum combat 95 120
radius* (nm)
87. Most Soviet reconnaissance units have secon-
dary missions and additional combat responsibilities.
For example, MIG-21 Fishbed H units normally de- 'Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with a
vote part of their training to ground attack, and one maximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff.
such unit may also be tasked with air defense. Some
MIG-25 Foxbat B/D aircraft are known to have
practiced supersonic, high-altitude runs which could 52o
be interpreted as simulating weapons delivery, but as
yet this aircraft is not known to carry either nuclear or
11-25
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.