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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap-
for radar vectoring of attack aircraft toward the target ons delivery role.
area, after which pilots are responsible for navigation 88. Helicopters. In recent years the Soviets have
to specific targets and their visual identification. Along introduced the MI-24 Hind, the first of their helicop-
the frontline, tactical controllers can hand over control ters designed primarily for ordnance delivery. (See
to ground-based forward air controllers, who would figure II-15.) It offers such advantages over earlier
then provide target-recognition guidance and, if neces- helicopters as improved all-weather capabilities and
sary, target marking. versatility. The Hind also has an air-to-air capability
85. Reconnaissance. In the Soviet view, the most against other helicopters and low, slow-flying fixed-
important function of tactical reconnaissance is to wing aircraft. A variant of the MI-8, the Hip E, has
detect enemy nuclear delivery means to enable accu- been equipped with rocket pods, machineguns, and
rate and timely execution of combat operations against antitank guided missiles.
them. Large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft are 89. Air Munitions. The Soviets are pursuing a
considered necessary to give proper support to offen- vigorous program to increase the effectiveness of their
sive operations. To provide this support, air reconnais~ air munitions to exploit the enhanced capabilities of
sance is conducted both as an integral part of other their newer aircraft. They apparently believe that the
basic air tasks and as a specified mission by special increased maintenance and training requirements gen-
fighter-reconnaissance and bomber-reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to
units. The Soviets believe that a variety of ground and correct the deficiencies of the older, simpler muni-
airborne sensors, together with visual observation, tions. The net effect of these air munition improve-
must be used to provide a multiple-source data base. rnent programs should be to reduce the number of
Improved sensors, including side-looking airborne ra- aircraft required for effective target destruction. The
dar (SLAR) and real-time television data link systems, improved guidance systems and delivery techniques
have been installed in some reconnaissance aircraft. also should increase the survivability of Pact aircraft in
86. Aerial reconnaissance capabilities range from an air conflict.
those provided by visual observation to the supersonic,
high-altitude MIG-25 Foxbat B/D. Reconnaissance Warsaw Pact Ground Figure 11-15
missions are a constant feature of Warsaw Pact exer- Attack Helicopters
cises; every Warsaw Pact aircrew has the responsibility MI-8 Hip E MI-24 Hind D
to report visual sightings. Specialized intelligence col-
lection aircraft are configured for photographic, active -
radar, communications, and electronic intelligence- 0 0
gathering missions. Mobile photo-processing units are
available at most Soviet reconnaissance units in East- Year operational 1977 1976
ern Europe. Although the total number of aircraft
with the primary mission of reconnaissance is known, Length (m) 18.2 17.3
our knowledge of their actual reconnaissance capabili-
ties, especially their timeliness and quality, is poor. Maximum useful 4,500 5,300
The lack of automated equipment or other means for load (kilograms,fuel
timely and accurate location and reporting of mobile and payload)'
or semimobile targets, is believed to be a current
weakness. Maximum combat 95 120
radius* (nm)
87. Most Soviet reconnaissance units have secon-
dary missions and additional combat responsibilities.
For example, MIG-21 Fishbed H units normally de- 'Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with a
vote part of their training to ground attack, and one maximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff.
such unit may also be tasked with air defense. Some
MIG-25 Foxbat B/D aircraft are known to have
practiced supersonic, high-altitude runs which could 52o
be interpreted as simulating weapons delivery, but as
yet this aircraft is not known to carry either nuclear or
11-25
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.