Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap- for radar vectoring of attack aircraft toward the target ons delivery role. area, after which pilots are responsible for navigation 88. Helicopters. In recent years the Soviets have to specific targets and their visual identification. Along introduced the MI-24 Hind, the first of their helicop- the frontline, tactical controllers can hand over control ters designed primarily for ordnance delivery. (See to ground-based forward air controllers, who would figure II-15.) It offers such advantages over earlier then provide target-recognition guidance and, if neces- helicopters as improved all-weather capabilities and sary, target marking. versatility. The Hind also has an air-to-air capability 85. Reconnaissance. In the Soviet view, the most against other helicopters and low, slow-flying fixed- important function of tactical reconnaissance is to wing aircraft. A variant of the MI-8, the Hip E, has detect enemy nuclear delivery means to enable accu- been equipped with rocket pods, machineguns, and rate and timely execution of combat operations against antitank guided missiles. them. Large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft are 89. Air Munitions. The Soviets are pursuing a considered necessary to give proper support to offen- vigorous program to increase the effectiveness of their sive operations. To provide this support, air reconnais~ air munitions to exploit the enhanced capabilities of sance is conducted both as an integral part of other their newer aircraft. They apparently believe that the basic air tasks and as a specified mission by special increased maintenance and training requirements gen- fighter-reconnaissance and bomber-reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a variety of ground and correct the deficiencies of the older, simpler muni- airborne sensors, together with visual observation, tions. The net effect of these air munition improve- must be used to provide a multiple-source data base. rnent programs should be to reduce the number of Improved sensors, including side-looking airborne ra- aircraft required for effective target destruction. The dar (SLAR) and real-time television data link systems, improved guidance systems and delivery techniques have been installed in some reconnaissance aircraft. also should increase the survivability of Pact aircraft in 86. Aerial reconnaissance capabilities range from an air conflict. those provided by visual observation to the supersonic, high-altitude MIG-25 Foxbat B/D. Reconnaissance Warsaw Pact Ground Figure 11-15 missions are a constant feature of Warsaw Pact exer- Attack Helicopters cises; every Warsaw Pact aircrew has the responsibility MI-8 Hip E MI-24 Hind D to report visual sightings. Specialized intelligence col- lection aircraft are configured for photographic, active - radar, communications, and electronic intelligence- 0 0 gathering missions. Mobile photo-processing units are available at most Soviet reconnaissance units in East- Year operational 1977 1976 ern Europe. Although the total number of aircraft with the primary mission of reconnaissance is known, Length (m) 18.2 17.3 our knowledge of their actual reconnaissance capabili- ties, especially their timeliness and quality, is poor. Maximum useful 4,500 5,300 The lack of automated equipment or other means for load (kilograms,fuel timely and accurate location and reporting of mobile and payload)' or semimobile targets, is believed to be a current weakness. Maximum combat 95 120 radius* (nm) 87. Most Soviet reconnaissance units have secon- dary missions and additional combat responsibilities. For example, MIG-21 Fishbed H units normally de- 'Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with a vote part of their training to ground attack, and one maximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff. such unit may also be tasked with air defense. Some MIG-25 Foxbat B/D aircraft are known to have practiced supersonic, high-altitude runs which could 52o be interpreted as simulating weapons delivery, but as yet this aircraft is not known to carry either nuclear or 11-25 Top ~c
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.