“Mission Control”29 pages
- p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link…
- p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
- p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
- p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either
broad range of missions…
- p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled
The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
- p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
- p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely…
- p. 59 …Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft
reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
- p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline…
- p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide
the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions
when…
- p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
- p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance
those two seas…
- p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
110…
- p. 84 …this mission.
The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
- p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
- p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans
other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
- p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces…
- p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and
integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
- p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or…
- p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified
missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
- p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
- p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with
flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
- p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at-
and…
- p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob-
to cope…
- p. 175 …be building a
mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
- p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
- p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
- p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
- p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The
against US carrier and…
Selected Warsaw Pact Fighter-Bomber Aircraft Figure 11-14
Year Maximum Representative NATO*
operational speed (knots) - fuel/weapons/payloads mission profile
Fuel Fuel Bomb, rocket or (radius in nm)
(kg) tanks TASM loads Hi-Lo-Hi Lo-Lo-Hi Lo-Lo-Lo
SU-17 Fitter D 1976 1,205 3,730 0 8x500-kg bombs 300 175 135
Mach 2.1 3,730 0 20x100-kg bombs 330 180 135
5,060 2 6x500-kg bombs 530 290 210
5,060 2 ECM pod and 595 320 225
96x57-mm rockets
5,060 2 4xAS-10 TASMs 580 300 215
MIG-27 Flogger D 1975 975 4,365 0 4x500-kg bombs 380 225 170
Mach 1.7 6,360 3 4x500-kg bombs 620 350 250
SU-24 Fencer A 1974 1,435 9,080 0 7x1,000-kg bombs 540 285 205
Mach 2.5 14,925 2 10x250-kg bombs 980 515 340
9,980 0 4xAS-10 TASMs 685 325 225
.14,925 2 4xAS-10 TASMs 1,075 530 400
13,290 2 2xAS-9 TASMs 935 460 315
The Central Intelligence Agency believes that the operational
assumptions basic to the NATO Mission Profile Hi-Lo-Hi def-
inition are extremely optimistic and produce combat radius es-
timates which cannot be achieved under wartime conditions.
CIA believes that the combat radii associated with.the
Lo-Lo-Hi definitions are much more in line with Warsaw Pact
estimates of the combat radius capability of Pact aircraft and
are in fact a more realistic reflection of Pact intentions
concerning the use of these aircraft.
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