Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Selected Warsaw Pact Fighter-Bomber Aircraft Figure 11-14
Year Maximum Representative NATO*
operational speed (knots) - fuel/weapons/payloads mission profile
Fuel Fuel Bomb, rocket or (radius in nm)
(kg) tanks TASM loads Hi-Lo-Hi Lo-Lo-Hi Lo-Lo-Lo
SU-17 Fitter D 1976 1,205 3,730 0 8x500-kg bombs 300 175 135
Mach 2.1 3,730 0 20x100-kg bombs 330 180 135
5,060 2 6x500-kg bombs 530 290 210
5,060 2 ECM pod and 595 320 225
96x57-mm rockets
5,060 2 4xAS-10 TASMs 580 300 215
MIG-27 Flogger D 1975 975 4,365 0 4x500-kg bombs 380 225 170
Mach 1.7 6,360 3 4x500-kg bombs 620 350 250
SU-24 Fencer A 1974 1,435 9,080 0 7x1,000-kg bombs 540 285 205
Mach 2.5 14,925 2 10x250-kg bombs 980 515 340
9,980 0 4xAS-10 TASMs 685 325 225
.14,925 2 4xAS-10 TASMs 1,075 530 400
13,290 2 2xAS-9 TASMs 935 460 315
The Central Intelligence Agency believes that the operational
assumptions basic to the NATO Mission Profile Hi-Lo-Hi def-
inition are extremely optimistic and produce combat radius es-
timates which cannot be achieved under wartime conditions.
CIA believes that the combat radii associated with.the
Lo-Lo-Hi definitions are much more in line with Warsaw Pact
estimates of the combat radius capability of Pact aircraft and
are in fact a more realistic reflection of Pact intentions
concerning the use of these aircraft.
579019 n cu
11-24

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.