Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top t Selected Warsaw Pact Figure 11-13 capability favor preplanned attacks to destroy, noct- Fighter Aircraft tralize, or delay NATO's forces before they can be brought to bear against Warsaw Pact forces. These MIG-21 Fishbed J MIG-23 Flogger B attacks are generally planned at such distances from Warsaw Pact ground forces that close coordination of each strike mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. 81. The Warsaw Pact has established a joint ground-air control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when required. It consists of a series of joint air control parties which are attached to the various ground force Length (m) 16 18 echelons, radar-equipped control teams, and ground- based forward air controllers. This system, which has been observed in training exercises since the earlyMaximum speed 1,260 knots 1,350 knots 1970s, may also be used to coordinate aircraft and Mach 2.2 Mach 2.35 ground-based air defenses, although how it would function in such an operation is not fully understood.Combat radius (nm): Subsonic area intercept 385 610 82. The introduction of new ground attack aircraft with 4 air-to-air missiles. has improved the Pact's capabilities in several respects. and 1 external fuel tank For example, the newer fighter-bombers-the Fencer, Flogger, and Fitter C/D-can carry at least twice theSupersonic area intercept 195 415 bomb payload of the older Fitter A and can deliverwith 4 air-to-air missiles this payload with approximately three to four times and 1 external fuel tank greater accuracy. (See figure 1I-14.) The net effect of the greater payload and delivery accuracy is that the Pact's newer ground attack aircraft are significantly 59ois. ., more effective than the earlier aircraft in ground attack missions. 83. The Pact's new aircraft can also be used under a greater variety of conditions. The new fighter-bomb- relatively ineffective in clouds. The latest fighter ers, for example, are more capable of striking ground variants carry semiactive radar homing missiles which targets in conditions of poor visibility. This capability alleviate this problem. is provided by an integrated weapons delivery and navigation system which allows the aircraft to arrive 79. Pact fighter units have a secondary mission of over large target areas such as airbases. However, the attacking ground targets but have recently cut back on pilot must still visually acquire individual small targets the amount of time their pilots devote to ground attack to ensure accurate weapons delivery. Tactically, such a training. Flight activity in Soviet fighter units over the capability would be most useful in conventional bomb- past two years has shown a 50-percent decrease in ing against targets occupying large areas or in deliver- ground attack training, which previously amounted to ing nuclear weapons. The SU-24 Fencer has a newer 15 percent of total combat training. Training no longer bomb navigation radar which should give it the capa- allocated to this secondary mission is devoted instead bility to deliver weapons with an error of 150 meters to air-intercept missions. in low visibility conditions against well-defined tar- 80. Conventional Ground Attack." Frontal Avi- gets. This is substantially better than the blind bomb- ation has the mission of conducting ground attack ing capability of Fitter C/D and Flogger D aircraft. operations against supply lines and rear area installa- 84. Warsaw Pact aircrews rely largely on some tions which support these forces. Soviet doctrine and form of control or direction from their ground-based command posts for all offensive support operations. "The nuclear strike capabilitics of Pact tactical air forces are This control often involves the use of airborne relay discussed in paragraphs 157 and 158 of this chapter. communications. Ground-based radar equipment with 11-23
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.