Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Top t
Selected Warsaw Pact Figure 11-13 capability favor preplanned attacks to destroy, noct-
Fighter Aircraft tralize, or delay NATO's forces before they can be
brought to bear against Warsaw Pact forces. These
MIG-21 Fishbed J MIG-23 Flogger B attacks are generally planned at such distances from
Warsaw Pact ground forces that close coordination of
each strike mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces is not required.
81. The Warsaw Pact has established a joint
ground-air control system which is designed to provide
the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions
when required. It consists of a series of joint air control
parties which are attached to the various ground force
Length (m) 16 18 echelons, radar-equipped control teams, and ground-
based forward air controllers. This system, which has
been observed in training exercises since the earlyMaximum speed 1,260 knots 1,350 knots 1970s, may also be used to coordinate aircraft and
Mach 2.2 Mach 2.35 ground-based air defenses, although how it would
function in such an operation is not fully understood.Combat radius (nm):
Subsonic area intercept 385 610 82. The introduction of new ground attack aircraft
with 4 air-to-air missiles. has improved the Pact's capabilities in several respects.
and 1 external fuel tank For example, the newer fighter-bombers-the Fencer,
Flogger, and Fitter C/D-can carry at least twice theSupersonic area intercept 195 415 bomb payload of the older Fitter A and can deliverwith 4 air-to-air missiles this payload with approximately three to four times
and 1 external fuel tank greater accuracy. (See figure 1I-14.) The net effect of
the greater payload and delivery accuracy is that the
Pact's newer ground attack aircraft are significantly
59ois. ., more effective than the earlier aircraft in ground
attack missions.
83. The Pact's new aircraft can also be used under a
greater variety of conditions. The new fighter-bomb-
relatively ineffective in clouds. The latest fighter ers, for example, are more capable of striking ground
variants carry semiactive radar homing missiles which targets in conditions of poor visibility. This capability
alleviate this problem. is provided by an integrated weapons delivery and
navigation system which allows the aircraft to arrive
79. Pact fighter units have a secondary mission of over large target areas such as airbases. However, the
attacking ground targets but have recently cut back on pilot must still visually acquire individual small targets
the amount of time their pilots devote to ground attack to ensure accurate weapons delivery. Tactically, such a
training. Flight activity in Soviet fighter units over the capability would be most useful in conventional bomb-
past two years has shown a 50-percent decrease in ing against targets occupying large areas or in deliver-
ground attack training, which previously amounted to ing nuclear weapons. The SU-24 Fencer has a newer
15 percent of total combat training. Training no longer bomb navigation radar which should give it the capa-
allocated to this secondary mission is devoted instead bility to deliver weapons with an error of 150 meters
to air-intercept missions. in low visibility conditions against well-defined tar-
80. Conventional Ground Attack." Frontal Avi- gets. This is substantially better than the blind bomb-
ation has the mission of conducting ground attack ing capability of Fitter C/D and Flogger D aircraft.
operations against supply lines and rear area installa- 84. Warsaw Pact aircrews rely largely on some
tions which support these forces. Soviet doctrine and form of control or direction from their ground-based
command posts for all offensive support operations.
"The nuclear strike capabilitics of Pact tactical air forces are This control often involves the use of airborne relay
discussed in paragraphs 157 and 158 of this chapter. communications. Ground-based radar equipment with
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