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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
op
Avionics Trends in Warsaw Pact Figure il-11 capable of conducting combat operations past the
Tactical Aircraft Opposite NATO, Rhine. Today, large numbers of Pact tactical aircraft
1969 and 1979 can operate well into France and the Benelux coun-
tries, illustrating the progress made by the Pact over
Number of Aircraft the past decade in the combat capabilities of its
tactical air forces. Figure 11-12 depicts the payload
Fighter Air-to-Air Avionics and operations radius of selected Pact tactical aircraft.
2,000
Rear Hemisphere, 76. Although recent improvements have signifi-.
Visual Only cantly enhanced the capability of the Pact's tactical air
forces to conduct long-range offensive operations, the
Rear Hemisphere, basic role of these forces remains unchanged. The
Adverse Weather Pact's tactical air forces continue to have two primary
1,000 missions-air defense and ground attack support of
the Pact's ground armies. The continuing emphasis on
air defense is indicated by the high priority in equip-
500 -Aspect ment modernization accorded fighter units.
Limited Lookdown/ 77. Air-to-Air Combat. The primary mission of the
Shootdown Warsaw Pact's tactical fighter forces is to engage
0 1969 1979 NATO's aircraft, preferably over NATO territory. All
Soviet Frontal Aviation fighter units are equipped
Fighter-Bomber and Light Bomber with all-weather MIG-21 or MIG-23 aircraft. (See
Bombing/ Navigation Avionics figure II-13.) About two-thirds of the fighters in the
2,000 NSWP tactical air forces are all-weather models. The
majority of the MIG-21s are the latest variants, which,
compared with earlier MIG-21s, have a greater fuel
Limited Navigation, and payload capability, an integral gun, and improved
Visual Bombing electronic equipment. MIG-23s now are in the inven-
tories of all Soviet Groups of Forces opposite NATO
1,000 Autonomous and in the western USSR. These aircraft are equipped
Navigation, with new air-to-air missiles. They have a 360-degree
-- Visual Bombig attack capability, but at low altitudes this capability is
" 500 ; Autonomous likely to be restricted to engagements from the rear.
Bombing and They have a limited capability to engage targets flying
; YNavigation below them at target altitudes of 500 meters over land
0 1969 1979 or 300 meters over water, although in such engage-
ments only a small altitude separation is possible.
577625 1-79 CIA 78. Other Warsaw Pact all-weather fighters are
limited by their radar equipment and armaments to
attacks from the rear against most aircraft targets.
Against slow-moving targets like helicopters flying at
sessing this capability. The fewer numbers, however, about 500 meters, they would be capable of head-on
have been more than offset by an increase in the attacks. Most Warsaw Pact fighters would experience
number of fighter-bomber units. Now also, some 30 considerable difficulty against low-flying targets be-
percent of the aircraft in Pact fighter-bomber units cause of limitations both in their radar equipment and
can navigate accurately at lower altitudes in adverse in air battle management capabilities. At low altitude,
weather using only onboard avionics, although they gun-armed fighters could engage a visually acquired
v to ae talforh treie target. Fighters using semiactive radar homing, beam-still have to acquire their targets visually for precise riding, or infrared missiles would generally requirewveapons delivery, favorable conditions for completing successful missile
75. In 1969 the Pact, with its short-range, low- attacks against low-flying aircraft. Some air-to-air
payload aircraft, had only a few tactical aircraft missiles are infrared homing versions which would be
11-21
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.