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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
op
Avionics Trends in Warsaw Pact Figure il-11 capable of conducting combat operations past the
Tactical Aircraft Opposite NATO, Rhine. Today, large numbers of Pact tactical aircraft
1969 and 1979 can operate well into France and the Benelux coun-
tries, illustrating the progress made by the Pact over
Number of Aircraft the past decade in the combat capabilities of its
tactical air forces. Figure 11-12 depicts the payload
Fighter Air-to-Air Avionics and operations radius of selected Pact tactical aircraft.
2,000
Rear Hemisphere, 76. Although recent improvements have signifi-.
Visual Only cantly enhanced the capability of the Pact's tactical air
forces to conduct long-range offensive operations, the
Rear Hemisphere, basic role of these forces remains unchanged. The
Adverse Weather Pact's tactical air forces continue to have two primary
1,000 missions-air defense and ground attack support of
the Pact's ground armies. The continuing emphasis on
air defense is indicated by the high priority in equip-
500 -Aspect ment modernization accorded fighter units.
Limited Lookdown/ 77. Air-to-Air Combat. The primary mission of the
Shootdown Warsaw Pact's tactical fighter forces is to engage
0 1969 1979 NATO's aircraft, preferably over NATO territory. All
Soviet Frontal Aviation fighter units are equipped
Fighter-Bomber and Light Bomber with all-weather MIG-21 or MIG-23 aircraft. (See
Bombing/ Navigation Avionics figure II-13.) About two-thirds of the fighters in the
2,000 NSWP tactical air forces are all-weather models. The
majority of the MIG-21s are the latest variants, which,
compared with earlier MIG-21s, have a greater fuel
Limited Navigation, and payload capability, an integral gun, and improved
Visual Bombing electronic equipment. MIG-23s now are in the inven-
tories of all Soviet Groups of Forces opposite NATO
1,000 Autonomous and in the western USSR. These aircraft are equipped
Navigation, with new air-to-air missiles. They have a 360-degree
-- Visual Bombig attack capability, but at low altitudes this capability is
" 500 ; Autonomous likely to be restricted to engagements from the rear.
Bombing and They have a limited capability to engage targets flying
; YNavigation below them at target altitudes of 500 meters over land
0 1969 1979 or 300 meters over water, although in such engage-
ments only a small altitude separation is possible.
577625 1-79 CIA 78. Other Warsaw Pact all-weather fighters are
limited by their radar equipment and armaments to
attacks from the rear against most aircraft targets.
Against slow-moving targets like helicopters flying at
sessing this capability. The fewer numbers, however, about 500 meters, they would be capable of head-on
have been more than offset by an increase in the attacks. Most Warsaw Pact fighters would experience
number of fighter-bomber units. Now also, some 30 considerable difficulty against low-flying targets be-
percent of the aircraft in Pact fighter-bomber units cause of limitations both in their radar equipment and
can navigate accurately at lower altitudes in adverse in air battle management capabilities. At low altitude,
weather using only onboard avionics, although they gun-armed fighters could engage a visually acquired
v to ae talforh treie target. Fighters using semiactive radar homing, beam-still have to acquire their targets visually for precise riding, or infrared missiles would generally requirewveapons delivery, favorable conditions for completing successful missile
75. In 1969 the Pact, with its short-range, low- attacks against low-flying aircraft. Some air-to-air
payload aircraft, had only a few tactical aircraft missiles are infrared homing versions which would be
11-21
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.