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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped with the
hampered by those pilots-25 to 35 percent of the Flogger B, which has an all-aspect intercept and
total available-who are not qualified to conduct night limited lookdown/shootdown capability. In 1969 all
or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilot profi- Pact fighter-bombers relied on ground-based naviga-
ciency has not progressed sufficiently to exploit fully tion aids or dead reckoning to navigate over NATO
the capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems territory, forcing them to operate at vulnerable me-
of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation. dium altitudes. Beagle and Brewer light bombers
The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are provided the Pact's only autonomous adverse weather
not trained as effectively as they should be, but for bombing/navigation capability. Today there are about
reasons that are not clear to us they do not appear to 45 percent fewer aircraft (Brewers and Fencers) pos-
be taking major corrective measures to enhance the
quality of training significantly. Such steps would
include devoting a greater share of training time to the
perforrance of combat-related tasks and introducing Figure a-10
more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics dearnizatiPact Tactical Air Forces
and simulated hostile air defense environments. Opposite NATO, 1969-1979
72. Combat Capabilities.One of the most signifi-
cant developments in Warsaw Pact tactical air forces
in recent years has been their modernization through
the introduction of new aircraft. The new aircraft Percent of Total Force
have greater ranges, can carry greater payloads, are soviet
equipped with better, more advanced avionics, and 100
arc armed with better, more effective munitions.
These attributes combine to give the Pact's air forces
the capacity to deliver more effective firepower under
a greater variety of conditions. Another significant
development in recent years has been the develop- 50
ment of heavily armed helicopters.
73. The Pact began reequipping its air forces in the 25
late 1960s with fighter units receiving initial priority.
Late-model MIG-21 Fishbed and MIG-23 Flogger B
aircraft were introduced to replace earlier model 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
Fishbeds in these units. Modernization of the fighter-
bomber forces began four to five years later with NSWP
SU-17 Fitter C/D, MIG-27 Flogger D, and some late-
model Fishbeds replacing the MIG-17 Fresco and
SU-7 Fitter A. Light-bomber units also began reequip- 75
ping in the mid-1970s by acquiring the SU-24 Fencer A
as a replacement for the YAK-28 Brewer B/C, Modern-
ization has progressed more rapidly in Soviet than in 50
the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraft now account for
about 80 percent of the Soviet force, 20 percent of the
NSWP force, and two-thirds of total Pact tactical air 25
force opposite NATO. (See figure I-10.)
74. In 1969 some 30 percent of the Pact's tactical 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
fighters were unable to conduct aerial engagements
under adverse weather conditions; all attacks had to be
performed from the real hemisphere, and the fighters
had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying
aircraft. (See figure II-11.) Today, nearly 95 percent of 571624 1.79 CIA
Pact fighters are able to operate in adverse weather,
11-20
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.