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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped with the
hampered by those pilots-25 to 35 percent of the Flogger B, which has an all-aspect intercept and
total available-who are not qualified to conduct night limited lookdown/shootdown capability. In 1969 all
or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilot profi- Pact fighter-bombers relied on ground-based naviga-
ciency has not progressed sufficiently to exploit fully tion aids or dead reckoning to navigate over NATO
the capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems territory, forcing them to operate at vulnerable me-
of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation. dium altitudes. Beagle and Brewer light bombers
The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are provided the Pact's only autonomous adverse weather
not trained as effectively as they should be, but for bombing/navigation capability. Today there are about
reasons that are not clear to us they do not appear to 45 percent fewer aircraft (Brewers and Fencers) pos-
be taking major corrective measures to enhance the
quality of training significantly. Such steps would
include devoting a greater share of training time to the
perforrance of combat-related tasks and introducing Figure a-10
more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics dearnizatiPact Tactical Air Forces
and simulated hostile air defense environments. Opposite NATO, 1969-1979
72. Combat Capabilities.One of the most signifi-
cant developments in Warsaw Pact tactical air forces
in recent years has been their modernization through
the introduction of new aircraft. The new aircraft Percent of Total Force
have greater ranges, can carry greater payloads, are soviet
equipped with better, more advanced avionics, and 100
arc armed with better, more effective munitions.
These attributes combine to give the Pact's air forces
the capacity to deliver more effective firepower under
a greater variety of conditions. Another significant
development in recent years has been the develop- 50
ment of heavily armed helicopters.
73. The Pact began reequipping its air forces in the 25
late 1960s with fighter units receiving initial priority.
Late-model MIG-21 Fishbed and MIG-23 Flogger B
aircraft were introduced to replace earlier model 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
Fishbeds in these units. Modernization of the fighter-
bomber forces began four to five years later with NSWP
SU-17 Fitter C/D, MIG-27 Flogger D, and some late-
model Fishbeds replacing the MIG-17 Fresco and
SU-7 Fitter A. Light-bomber units also began reequip- 75
ping in the mid-1970s by acquiring the SU-24 Fencer A
as a replacement for the YAK-28 Brewer B/C, Modern-
ization has progressed more rapidly in Soviet than in 50
the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraft now account for
about 80 percent of the Soviet force, 20 percent of the
NSWP force, and two-thirds of total Pact tactical air 25
force opposite NATO. (See figure I-10.)
74. In 1969 some 30 percent of the Pact's tactical 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
fighters were unable to conduct aerial engagements
under adverse weather conditions; all attacks had to be
performed from the real hemisphere, and the fighters
had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying
aircraft. (See figure II-11.) Today, nearly 95 percent of 571624 1.79 CIA
Pact fighters are able to operate in adverse weather,
11-20
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.