“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped with the
hampered by those pilots-25 to 35 percent of the Flogger B, which has an all-aspect intercept and
total available-who are not qualified to conduct night limited lookdown/shootdown capability. In 1969 all
or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilot profi- Pact fighter-bombers relied on ground-based naviga-
ciency has not progressed sufficiently to exploit fully tion aids or dead reckoning to navigate over NATO
the capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems territory, forcing them to operate at vulnerable me-
of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation. dium altitudes. Beagle and Brewer light bombers
The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are provided the Pact's only autonomous adverse weather
not trained as effectively as they should be, but for bombing/navigation capability. Today there are about
reasons that are not clear to us they do not appear to 45 percent fewer aircraft (Brewers and Fencers) pos-
be taking major corrective measures to enhance the
quality of training significantly. Such steps would
include devoting a greater share of training time to the
perforrance of combat-related tasks and introducing Figure a-10
more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics dearnizatiPact Tactical Air Forces
and simulated hostile air defense environments. Opposite NATO, 1969-1979
72. Combat Capabilities.One of the most signifi-
cant developments in Warsaw Pact tactical air forces
in recent years has been their modernization through
the introduction of new aircraft. The new aircraft Percent of Total Force
have greater ranges, can carry greater payloads, are soviet
equipped with better, more advanced avionics, and 100
arc armed with better, more effective munitions.
These attributes combine to give the Pact's air forces
the capacity to deliver more effective firepower under
a greater variety of conditions. Another significant
development in recent years has been the develop- 50
ment of heavily armed helicopters.
73. The Pact began reequipping its air forces in the 25
late 1960s with fighter units receiving initial priority.
Late-model MIG-21 Fishbed and MIG-23 Flogger B
aircraft were introduced to replace earlier model 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
Fishbeds in these units. Modernization of the fighter-
bomber forces began four to five years later with NSWP
SU-17 Fitter C/D, MIG-27 Flogger D, and some late-
model Fishbeds replacing the MIG-17 Fresco and
SU-7 Fitter A. Light-bomber units also began reequip- 75
ping in the mid-1970s by acquiring the SU-24 Fencer A
as a replacement for the YAK-28 Brewer B/C, Modern-
ization has progressed more rapidly in Soviet than in 50
the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraft now account for
about 80 percent of the Soviet force, 20 percent of the
NSWP force, and two-thirds of total Pact tactical air 25
force opposite NATO. (See figure I-10.)
74. In 1969 some 30 percent of the Pact's tactical 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
fighters were unable to conduct aerial engagements
under adverse weather conditions; all attacks had to be
performed from the real hemisphere, and the fighters
had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying
aircraft. (See figure II-11.) Today, nearly 95 percent of 571624 1.79 CIA
Pact fighters are able to operate in adverse weather,
11-20
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