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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
cantly improved the runway capability at 62 military 68. Dispersal airfields with natural surfaces con-
airfields in the NSWP countries and the USSR west of tinue to be maintained in an operational condition in
the Urals. All major military and most civil airfields in the forward areas. Teams of personnel to operate these
the Pact countries have been, or are being, equipped airfields appear to be available at the main operating
with modern lighting, improved navigational aid bases. There is uncertainty, however, about the avail-
equipment, more adequate and improved refueling ability of sufficient ground support equipment to
systems, and other ancillary support facilities. Installa- sustain operations from these bases concurrently with
tions for the storage, testing, and handling of air-to-air main base operations. Some storage facilities, with
(AAM) and air-to-surface (ASM) guided missiles have sufficient POL and ammunition for a limited number
been identified at most military airfields which have of sorties, are located near the natural-surface air-
aircraft equipped with these weapons. Approximately fields. These cannot be used, however, by some of the
3,400 shelters (hangarettes) have been built since the more modern aircraft. On balance, supply stocks in
late 1960s to protect aircraft at main operating bases in depots, pipeline, and transport organizations appear
the USSR west of the Urals and in the NSWP coun- adequate to support reinforcement aircraft from the
tries. Other defensive improvements include harden- western USSR or other intratheater redeployments.
ing and increasing POL and ammunition storage 69. Pilot Training and Proficienc. ]3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline systems to service aircraft in ., .
shelters. gram is more conducive to perfecting a pilot s basic
flying skills than to preparing him for combat. A
66. This airfield development program has typical Soviet pilot spends four years in a flying school
achieved four specific objectives. First, the Soviets and an additional three to four years training in an
have expanded their pilot and navigator training operational combat unit before he is considered quali-
capability by building new training airfields and fied, by Soviet standards, to carry out the full range of
improving existing ones. Second, they have improved combat missions assigned to his unit. In conducting
their airfield capability within the Soviet Union to operational training, a Soviet tactical pilot flies ap-
support their new, longer range, higher performance proximately the same number of sorties per year as his
ground attack fighter aircraft and the Backfire US counterpart, but the sorties are less than half as
bomber, Third, all Pact nations have increased the long in duration and involve far fewer combat-related
survivability and sustainability of their combat air training events.
forces. Fourth, they have increased their capability 70. In recent years, activity specifically identified
to conceal and protect large numbers of aircraft in 70 Inareetraiity spe t i
bunkrs.Theoveallneteffct f te Pct iliary as combat-related training has amounted to approxi-
bunkers. The overall net effect of the Pact militar mately 25 percent of the total number of flights by
airfield development since 1968 is a greater capabi- Frontal Aviation pilots in East Germany. The purpose
lity to conduct both offensive and defensive air of some other flight activity, which in the Unitedoperatio~ns.. States is termed "mission in zone" training, is the
67. Recent developments tend to indicate that the subject of some disagreement within the Intelligence
Warsaw Pact and particularly Soviet Frontal Aviation Community. According to one view, 0 this.activity is
plan to conduct most wartime operations from main largely aerobatic and not combat related. At least 80
airfields where aircraft can be protected in hardened percent involves a single aircraft that does not practice
aircraft shelters. For more than 85 percent of the engaging aerial or ground targets. An alternative
Soviet tactical aircraft in the NSWP countries, there view " holds that because little is known about the
now are facilities adequate to accommodate one specifics of this activity, and because more than one
armed, combat-ready aircraft per shelter. The sharing aircraft are known to have engaged in this activity
of shelters would provide protection for many more simultaneously in the same general area, some addi-
aircraft, although readiness would suffer because of tional combat training may be involved.
engine starting restrictions and ground handling prob-
lems. About half of the 1,200 or so shelters on Soviet 7L Despite increases in the number of pilots as-
main bases could be used to shelter more than one signed to Soviet units in the forward area, the overall
aircraft; this would provide protection for over 600 a The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.additional reinforcement aircraft. Still more aircraft " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
could be given some protection by on-base dispersal Agency; the Director,National Security Agency; and the Assistant
and use of revetments. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.