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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
cantly improved the runway capability at 62 military 68. Dispersal airfields with natural surfaces con-
airfields in the NSWP countries and the USSR west of tinue to be maintained in an operational condition in
the Urals. All major military and most civil airfields in the forward areas. Teams of personnel to operate these
the Pact countries have been, or are being, equipped airfields appear to be available at the main operating
with modern lighting, improved navigational aid bases. There is uncertainty, however, about the avail-
equipment, more adequate and improved refueling ability of sufficient ground support equipment to
systems, and other ancillary support facilities. Installa- sustain operations from these bases concurrently with
tions for the storage, testing, and handling of air-to-air main base operations. Some storage facilities, with
(AAM) and air-to-surface (ASM) guided missiles have sufficient POL and ammunition for a limited number
been identified at most military airfields which have of sorties, are located near the natural-surface air-
aircraft equipped with these weapons. Approximately fields. These cannot be used, however, by some of the
3,400 shelters (hangarettes) have been built since the more modern aircraft. On balance, supply stocks in
late 1960s to protect aircraft at main operating bases in depots, pipeline, and transport organizations appear
the USSR west of the Urals and in the NSWP coun- adequate to support reinforcement aircraft from the
tries. Other defensive improvements include harden- western USSR or other intratheater redeployments.
ing and increasing POL and ammunition storage 69. Pilot Training and Proficienc. ]3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline systems to service aircraft in ., .
shelters. gram is more conducive to perfecting a pilot s basic
flying skills than to preparing him for combat. A
66. This airfield development program has typical Soviet pilot spends four years in a flying school
achieved four specific objectives. First, the Soviets and an additional three to four years training in an
have expanded their pilot and navigator training operational combat unit before he is considered quali-
capability by building new training airfields and fied, by Soviet standards, to carry out the full range of
improving existing ones. Second, they have improved combat missions assigned to his unit. In conducting
their airfield capability within the Soviet Union to operational training, a Soviet tactical pilot flies ap-
support their new, longer range, higher performance proximately the same number of sorties per year as his
ground attack fighter aircraft and the Backfire US counterpart, but the sorties are less than half as
bomber, Third, all Pact nations have increased the long in duration and involve far fewer combat-related
survivability and sustainability of their combat air training events.
forces. Fourth, they have increased their capability 70. In recent years, activity specifically identified
to conceal and protect large numbers of aircraft in 70 Inareetraiity spe t i
bunkrs.Theoveallneteffct f te Pct iliary as combat-related training has amounted to approxi-
bunkers. The overall net effect of the Pact militar mately 25 percent of the total number of flights by
airfield development since 1968 is a greater capabi- Frontal Aviation pilots in East Germany. The purpose
lity to conduct both offensive and defensive air of some other flight activity, which in the Unitedoperatio~ns.. States is termed "mission in zone" training, is the
67. Recent developments tend to indicate that the subject of some disagreement within the Intelligence
Warsaw Pact and particularly Soviet Frontal Aviation Community. According to one view, 0 this.activity is
plan to conduct most wartime operations from main largely aerobatic and not combat related. At least 80
airfields where aircraft can be protected in hardened percent involves a single aircraft that does not practice
aircraft shelters. For more than 85 percent of the engaging aerial or ground targets. An alternative
Soviet tactical aircraft in the NSWP countries, there view " holds that because little is known about the
now are facilities adequate to accommodate one specifics of this activity, and because more than one
armed, combat-ready aircraft per shelter. The sharing aircraft are known to have engaged in this activity
of shelters would provide protection for many more simultaneously in the same general area, some addi-
aircraft, although readiness would suffer because of tional combat training may be involved.
engine starting restrictions and ground handling prob-
lems. About half of the 1,200 or so shelters on Soviet 7L Despite increases in the number of pilots as-
main bases could be used to shelter more than one signed to Soviet units in the forward area, the overall
aircraft; this would provide protection for over 600 a The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.additional reinforcement aircraft. Still more aircraft " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
could be given some protection by on-base dispersal Agency; the Director,National Security Agency; and the Assistant
and use of revetments. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.