Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
cantly improved the runway capability at 62 military 68. Dispersal airfields with natural surfaces con-
airfields in the NSWP countries and the USSR west of tinue to be maintained in an operational condition in
the Urals. All major military and most civil airfields in the forward areas. Teams of personnel to operate these
the Pact countries have been, or are being, equipped airfields appear to be available at the main operating
with modern lighting, improved navigational aid bases. There is uncertainty, however, about the avail-
equipment, more adequate and improved refueling ability of sufficient ground support equipment to
systems, and other ancillary support facilities. Installa- sustain operations from these bases concurrently with
tions for the storage, testing, and handling of air-to-air main base operations. Some storage facilities, with
(AAM) and air-to-surface (ASM) guided missiles have sufficient POL and ammunition for a limited number
been identified at most military airfields which have of sorties, are located near the natural-surface air-
aircraft equipped with these weapons. Approximately fields. These cannot be used, however, by some of the
3,400 shelters (hangarettes) have been built since the more modern aircraft. On balance, supply stocks in
late 1960s to protect aircraft at main operating bases in depots, pipeline, and transport organizations appear
the USSR west of the Urals and in the NSWP coun- adequate to support reinforcement aircraft from the
tries. Other defensive improvements include harden- western USSR or other intratheater redeployments.
ing and increasing POL and ammunition storage 69. Pilot Training and Proficienc. ]3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline systems to service aircraft in ., .
shelters. gram is more conducive to perfecting a pilot s basic
flying skills than to preparing him for combat. A
66. This airfield development program has typical Soviet pilot spends four years in a flying school
achieved four specific objectives. First, the Soviets and an additional three to four years training in an
have expanded their pilot and navigator training operational combat unit before he is considered quali-
capability by building new training airfields and fied, by Soviet standards, to carry out the full range of
improving existing ones. Second, they have improved combat missions assigned to his unit. In conducting
their airfield capability within the Soviet Union to operational training, a Soviet tactical pilot flies ap-
support their new, longer range, higher performance proximately the same number of sorties per year as his
ground attack fighter aircraft and the Backfire US counterpart, but the sorties are less than half as
bomber, Third, all Pact nations have increased the long in duration and involve far fewer combat-related
survivability and sustainability of their combat air training events.
forces. Fourth, they have increased their capability 70. In recent years, activity specifically identified
to conceal and protect large numbers of aircraft in 70 Inareetraiity spe t i
bunkrs.Theoveallneteffct f te Pct iliary as combat-related training has amounted to approxi-
bunkers. The overall net effect of the Pact militar mately 25 percent of the total number of flights by
airfield development since 1968 is a greater capabi- Frontal Aviation pilots in East Germany. The purpose
lity to conduct both offensive and defensive air of some other flight activity, which in the Unitedoperatio~ns.. States is termed "mission in zone" training, is the
67. Recent developments tend to indicate that the subject of some disagreement within the Intelligence
Warsaw Pact and particularly Soviet Frontal Aviation Community. According to one view, 0 this.activity is
plan to conduct most wartime operations from main largely aerobatic and not combat related. At least 80
airfields where aircraft can be protected in hardened percent involves a single aircraft that does not practice
aircraft shelters. For more than 85 percent of the engaging aerial or ground targets. An alternative
Soviet tactical aircraft in the NSWP countries, there view " holds that because little is known about the
now are facilities adequate to accommodate one specifics of this activity, and because more than one
armed, combat-ready aircraft per shelter. The sharing aircraft are known to have engaged in this activity
of shelters would provide protection for many more simultaneously in the same general area, some addi-
aircraft, although readiness would suffer because of tional combat training may be involved.
engine starting restrictions and ground handling prob-
lems. About half of the 1,200 or so shelters on Soviet 7L Despite increases in the number of pilots as-
main bases could be used to shelter more than one signed to Soviet units in the forward area, the overall
aircraft; this would provide protection for over 600 a The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.additional reinforcement aircraft. Still more aircraft " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
could be given some protection by on-base dispersal Agency; the Director,National Security Agency; and the Assistant
and use of revetments. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
_ t-19

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.