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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
wartime strength. In light of this evidence we estimate Increase in Warsaw Pact Figure 11-9
the other Soviet air divisions in Central Europe are Helicopters Opposite NATO,
similarly manned. We have good evidence on person- 1969 and 1979
nel strengths for only one NSWP air force. This 1969
evidence indicates that the total force is manned at 60
percent of wartime strength and combat air units at 70 3,000
percent. We estimate that the other NSWP air forces
are also manned below their intended wartime
strengths. We have no good evidence, however, on the 2,000
extent of this undernanning. Pact air units could
initiate combat operations utilizing existing peacetime
strengths; however, mobilization of additional person- 1,000
nel would be required before the Pact could conduct a combat Helicopters i
sustained large-scale air offensive. Support Helicopters '
62. Helicopter Forces. Warsaw Pact helicopter 0 1969 1979
forces have two primary missions: combat and combat
support. Combat helicopters include those assigned to
units responsible for attacking ground targets or trans-
porting assault troops. Opposite NATO the Pact has 577627 1-79 CiA
assigned some 1,700 combat helicopters to this mission.
(See table 1I-5.) Of these, about 300 helicopters have as
their primary mission the attack of. ground targets; and
the remaining 1,400 helicopters have a primary mis_ vary in size from 50 to more than 100 helicopters.
sion of transporting assault forces. An additional 900 NSWP helicopter regiments generally are smaller than
helicopters are assigned to Pact units opposite NATO Soviet regiments. If used to transport troops, each
for various combat support roles including rescue, Soviet ground attack helicopter regiment probably
communications, relay, airborne command posts, artil- could lift simultaneously one or two reinforced motor-
lery spotting, electronic warfare, and liaison. A signifi- ized rifle battalions without their vehicles. Soviet
cant development in recent years has been the intro- assault transport regiments using only MI-8 Hip heli-
duction of heavily armed helicopters. Figure 11-9 copters could conduct the simultaneous lift of two to
shows the increase in the number of Pact helicopters three reinforced motorized rifle battalions without
opposite NATO since the early 1970s. their vehicles. Using both Hip and MI-6 Hook helicop-
ters, these assault transport regiments could lift a force
63. Soviet combat helicopters (ground attack and of the same size along with heavier equipment and
assault transport) are organized into regiments which light armored vehicles. The largest ground force unit
transported by helicopters would probably be of regi-
Table II-5 mental size.
Warsaw Pact Helicopters Opposite NATO * 64. Base Structure. The Warsaw Pact has an ex-
January 1979 tensive airfield network from which to launch and
In Eastern Europe In the sustain military air operations. In the USSR west of the
Primary Mission Soviet NSWP USSR Total Urals there are some 230 active military airfields; the
Comba Hlcte ______ _- Soviets also operate 40 military airfields in the NSWP
Ground Attack 175 25 110 310 countries. Eighty-four airfields operated by the NSWP
Assault Transport 275 555 555 1,385 air forces complement the Soviet base structure. There
Total Combat 450 580 665 1,695 are hundreds of other airfields-civil, factory flyaway,
Support Helicopters 370 125 425 920 and unoccupied (including dispersal) fields, highway
----- ---- - strips, and fields with temporary surfaces-which
Grand Total 820 705 1,090 2,615 could be used by military aircraft.
* See footnote to table II-i, following paragraph 3. See table B-3
in annex 13for a detailed order of battle of Pact helicopter forces
opposite NATO. construction of at least 11 new military airfields,
StE -- started construction of at least nine others, and signifi-
11-18
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.