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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979
Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
- p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link…
- p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
- p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
- p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either
broad range of missions…
- p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled
The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
- p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
- p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely…
- p. 59 …Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft
reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
- p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline…
- p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide
the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions
when…
- p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
- p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance
those two seas…
- p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
110…
- p. 84 …this mission.
The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
- p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
- p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans
other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
- p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces…
- p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and
integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
- p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or…
- p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified
missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
- p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
- p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with
flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
- p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at-
and…
- p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob-
to cope…
- p. 175 …be building a
mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
- p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
- p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
- p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
- p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The
against US carrier and…
PREFACE
This National Intelligence Estimate was prepared primarily to
satisfy the need expressed by US policymakers and planners for a
reference document that would record current estimates of Warsaw
Pact forces and intelligence judgments about the way ,these forces would
be employed in a war with NATO. It is intended to provide a baseline
for any further studies comparing NATO and Pact forces.
This NIE is the first comprehensive estimate of Warsaw Pact forces
opposite NATO since 1971. It is the first to attempt an analysis of Pact
campaign plans for the European theaters of military operations and
the first to integrate naval forces into these campaigns. It deals
primarily with conventional forces and operations; it describes nuclear
forces but provides only limited treatment of theater nuclear operations.
The NIE is in two volumes. This volume presents a detailed
discussion of Pact doctrine, theater forces, and operational concepts for
war in Europe. It also describes the main developments and trends in
Pact theater forces and discusses those issues which bear most directly
on the capabilities of Pact forces to perform their missions. Volume I is
a summary of the Estimate.
The Estimate provides, particularly in its graphics, a great deal of
information concerning the technical performance characteristics of
Warsaw Pact weapon systems. This information is for general reference
purposes only. More detailed data on characteristics of Pact weapons
can be found in separate publications prepared by the various agencies
within the Intelligence Community.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.