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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top rt
intercontinental nuclear strikes and conventional or Table II-4
nuclear strikes in support of theater forces. Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft
reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and helicop- Opposite NATO a
ter ground attack and troop lift. The primary mission January 1979
of VTA is the transport of airborne assault forces. In Eastern Europe In the
57. All NSWP countries have air forces for national Soviet NSWP USSR Total b
air defense. In addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Fighter 765 295 675 1,735
Bulgaria have tactical air forces. East Germany has Fighter-Bomber 450 630 650 1,730
one ground attack unit and Rornania has two. None of Light Bomber 30 - 30 60
the NSWP air forces have sufficient transport aircraft Reconnaissance/EW 175 245 245 665
to support other than small-scale airlift operations. The Total 1,420 1,170 1,600 4,190
current personnel strength of the Soviet air forces
opposite NATO is estimated to be about 500,000 and a See footnote to table I-1, following paragraph 3. Also see table
B-2 in annex B for a more detailed order of battle of Pact tactical
that of the NSWP air forces stands at about 200,000. aircraft.
Figure 11-8 shows the geographic disposition of Pact b Tese totals do not include about 1,210 fighters assigned to the
air forces opposite NATO. NSWP national air defense commands or trainers and combat
reserve aircraft.
Tactical Air Forces forces in operations that would be temporarily con-
58. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. There are about 4,600 trolled by a command at a higher level than the front,
fixed-wing combat aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation . such as at the theater or Moscow level.
and another 1,175 in NSWP tactical air units. Al-
though there was sizable growth in Soviet Frontal 60. The basic combat unit of Pact tactical air forces
Aviation during the late 1960s, primarily because of is the regiment (or wing in the East German Air
the buildup against China, the size of Pact tactical air Force), each of which is assigned a primary mission.
forces opposite NATO has been relatively stable at There are essentially four types of regiments: fighter
approximately 4,200 fixed-wing combat aircraft. We regiments, which would be used primarily in air-to-air
have evidence that the Soviets have resubordinated at combat; fighter-bomber and light bomber regiments,
least several strategic air defense regiments to Frontal which would be used to attack ground targets; and
Aviation. The full extent of these changes is unclear, reconnaissance regiments, which would provide photo-
however, and their impact on the structure and size of graphic and electronic reconnaissance. Each regiment
Soviet Frontal Aviation has not yet been determined. normally consists of three flight squadrons, and head-
Accordingly, these resubordinated aircraft are not quarters, flightline maintenance, and general mainten-
reflected in our tabulations of the strength of Frontal ance elements. Fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons
Aviation shown in this Estimate. (See table 11-4.) generally have 12 aircraft; and light bomber squad-
rons, 10 aircraft. Most fighter and fighter-bomber
59. These forces are divided into air armies or regiments also have six to 10 additional combat air-
tactical air elements. Soviet Frontal Aviation is orga- craft for maintenance float, four to six combat-capable
nized into 16 air armies, most of which are located trainers, and three to four non-combat-capable train-
along the periphery of the USSR in areas adjoining ers for training and administrative purposes. A typical
potential combat areas or in Eastern Europe. Non- regiment may number about 500 personnel, including
Soviet Warsaw Pact tactical air forces include air some 60 pilots in flight status. Supporting each regi-
armies in Czechoslovakia and Poland, an air corps in ment are an independent base maintenance battalion
Bulgaria, and some independent fighter-bomber and and a signals battalion manned with as many as 700
reconnaissance units in East Germany and Romania. additional personnel.
The size and composition of the air armies vary
greatly depending on location and assigned missions. 61. Those Warsaw Pact airforces in Central Eu-
The Soviet 16th Tactical Air Army in East Germany is rope for which we have good evidence are manned at
the largest and best equipped. In wartime, combat varying levels below their intended wartime personnel
operations by individual air armies would usually be strengths. Evidence relating to two of the five Soviet
controlled by the various Pact front commanders, air divisions in East Germany, for example, indicates
Ihowever, the Pact has plans for the use of tactical air that they are manned at 80 percent of their planned
II-16
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.