Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

interpreted in light of the way the Soviet command for several reasons: many problems are endemic to a
system is supposed to work. Little detailed planning, peacetime military force and probably would disap-
coordination, or initiative is expected of squad, pla- pear in time of war; the Soviet system and authorities
toon, company, and battalion commanders. These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely supervised time; and a basic feeling of respect for authority and
executors of detailed plans drawn up at regimental patriotism, continually exploited by authorities, pro-
and higher levels. This system could discourage inde- vides an underlying motivation to the Soviet soldier for
pendent small-unit actions, but would probably cause honorable service and obedience.
Soviet forces to be rapidly responsive to the commands Ready Reserves
of regiment and division commanders.
54. According to the Soviet Law on Universal Mili-
50. The Soviet soldier is well drilled in his job. Units tary Service, Soviet soldiers have a reserve obligation
generally can carry out the basic maneuvers envi- after discharge from active duty. Enlisted men must
sioned in tactical doctrine. Major weaknesses include remain in the reserves until age 50, with refresher
the prevalence of rote, unrealistic, drill-type training training scheduled according to the age of the reserv-
at lower levels. The heavy use of simulators, subcaliber ist. Officers under 35 years old are subject to annual
devices, and training equipment adds to this lack of recall for periods as long as three months, until a
realism. Army- and front-level staffs train primarily maximum of 30 months of reserve training has been
by command post exercises, often with extensive signal completed. Reserve officers under 30 years of age may
support and limited troop participation. While these be recalled to active duty for two to three years during
exercises often involve realistic scenarios, staffs rarely peacetime, but this is rarely done. NSWP countries
have the opportunity actually to control and coordi- have similar laws but they vary in some details.
nate large numbers of troops in the field. 55. Training for Pact reservists is uneven. Although
51. The Warsaw Pact military structure is predi- many reservists would probably fill mobilization posi-
cated on a harsh and demanding disciplinary system tions that require little military expertise or require
which exacts unquestioning obedience and adherence skills similar to those of their civilian occupations, most
to regulations. In practice, however, it is evident that apparently do not receive periodic refresher training.
Pact forces suffer from the same breaches of discipline By contrast, a small group of reservists who are to be
that are found in other armies. These include alcohol- mobilized for the operation or maintenance of com-
ism, desertion and AWOL, misappropriation of mili- plex equipment are called up frequently for training.
tary equipment, and black-market activities. Statistics Reserve training would not be a significant factor in
pertaining to these breaches of discipline are impossi- the combat effectiveness of those divisions in which
ble to obtain, but Soviet military authorities appear to most key positions are already filled by active-duty
be concerned about them, and we receive reports of personnel. In cadre divisions, however, where reserv-
their occurrence, particularly in the Soviet armed ists must assume a large portion of the responsibility,
forces, often enough to indicate that the problem is training deficiencies would reduce unit effectiveness.
resftent. The initial effectiveness of recalled reservists, in any
case, would depend upon the length of time since
52. Morale problems are also prevalent. Certain release from active duty. In most cases, priority of
problems, such as alcoholism and ethnic hostility, are recall would be directed toward those most recently
common to Soviet and East European societies in released, thereby reducing refresher training burdens
general. Others, such as desertion and suicide, prob- and minimizing reservist handicaps stemming from a
ably are a reflection of the harshness of military life. lack of updated training.
The soldier receives extremely low pay, his housing
and food are barely adequate, he is subject to constant B Warsaw Pact Air Forces
abuse or harassment by NCOs and officers, and his 56. The Soviet Air Forces are divided into three
training is repetitive and boring. In addition, he is functional components: Long Range Aviation (LRA),
often a victim of prejudice and hostility if he is a Frontal (tactical) Aviation, and Military Transport
'member of a minority group. Soviet troops are usually Aviation (VTA). 8 The primary missions of LRA are
isolated from the civilian populace, as is the particular 9Details of the role and capabilities of LRA in theater war are
case of the Soviet soldier in Eastern Europe. discussed in section D of this chapter (beginning at paragraph 153)
and in chapters IV and V. Soviet Naval Aviation is treated in section
53. These morale and disciplinary problems prob- C of this chapter (beginning of paragraph 100) and in chapter IV.
ably do not impair overall combat or unit effectiveness Soviet strategic air defense forces are discussed in NIE 11-3/8-78.
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