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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
interpreted in light of the way the Soviet command for several reasons: many problems are endemic to a
system is supposed to work. Little detailed planning, peacetime military force and probably would disap-
coordination, or initiative is expected of squad, pla- pear in time of war; the Soviet system and authorities
toon, company, and battalion commanders. These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely supervised time; and a basic feeling of respect for authority and
executors of detailed plans drawn up at regimental patriotism, continually exploited by authorities, pro-
and higher levels. This system could discourage inde- vides an underlying motivation to the Soviet soldier for
pendent small-unit actions, but would probably cause honorable service and obedience.
Soviet forces to be rapidly responsive to the commands Ready Reserves
of regiment and division commanders.
54. According to the Soviet Law on Universal Mili-
50. The Soviet soldier is well drilled in his job. Units tary Service, Soviet soldiers have a reserve obligation
generally can carry out the basic maneuvers envi- after discharge from active duty. Enlisted men must
sioned in tactical doctrine. Major weaknesses include remain in the reserves until age 50, with refresher
the prevalence of rote, unrealistic, drill-type training training scheduled according to the age of the reserv-
at lower levels. The heavy use of simulators, subcaliber ist. Officers under 35 years old are subject to annual
devices, and training equipment adds to this lack of recall for periods as long as three months, until a
realism. Army- and front-level staffs train primarily maximum of 30 months of reserve training has been
by command post exercises, often with extensive signal completed. Reserve officers under 30 years of age may
support and limited troop participation. While these be recalled to active duty for two to three years during
exercises often involve realistic scenarios, staffs rarely peacetime, but this is rarely done. NSWP countries
have the opportunity actually to control and coordi- have similar laws but they vary in some details.
nate large numbers of troops in the field. 55. Training for Pact reservists is uneven. Although
51. The Warsaw Pact military structure is predi- many reservists would probably fill mobilization posi-
cated on a harsh and demanding disciplinary system tions that require little military expertise or require
which exacts unquestioning obedience and adherence skills similar to those of their civilian occupations, most
to regulations. In practice, however, it is evident that apparently do not receive periodic refresher training.
Pact forces suffer from the same breaches of discipline By contrast, a small group of reservists who are to be
that are found in other armies. These include alcohol- mobilized for the operation or maintenance of com-
ism, desertion and AWOL, misappropriation of mili- plex equipment are called up frequently for training.
tary equipment, and black-market activities. Statistics Reserve training would not be a significant factor in
pertaining to these breaches of discipline are impossi- the combat effectiveness of those divisions in which
ble to obtain, but Soviet military authorities appear to most key positions are already filled by active-duty
be concerned about them, and we receive reports of personnel. In cadre divisions, however, where reserv-
their occurrence, particularly in the Soviet armed ists must assume a large portion of the responsibility,
forces, often enough to indicate that the problem is training deficiencies would reduce unit effectiveness.
resftent. The initial effectiveness of recalled reservists, in any
case, would depend upon the length of time since
52. Morale problems are also prevalent. Certain release from active duty. In most cases, priority of
problems, such as alcoholism and ethnic hostility, are recall would be directed toward those most recently
common to Soviet and East European societies in released, thereby reducing refresher training burdens
general. Others, such as desertion and suicide, prob- and minimizing reservist handicaps stemming from a
ably are a reflection of the harshness of military life. lack of updated training.
The soldier receives extremely low pay, his housing
and food are barely adequate, he is subject to constant B Warsaw Pact Air Forces
abuse or harassment by NCOs and officers, and his 56. The Soviet Air Forces are divided into three
training is repetitive and boring. In addition, he is functional components: Long Range Aviation (LRA),
often a victim of prejudice and hostility if he is a Frontal (tactical) Aviation, and Military Transport
'member of a minority group. Soviet troops are usually Aviation (VTA). 8 The primary missions of LRA are
isolated from the civilian populace, as is the particular 9Details of the role and capabilities of LRA in theater war are
case of the Soviet soldier in Eastern Europe. discussed in section D of this chapter (beginning at paragraph 153)
and in chapters IV and V. Soviet Naval Aviation is treated in section
53. These morale and disciplinary problems prob- C of this chapter (beginning of paragraph 100) and in chapter IV.
ably do not impair overall combat or unit effectiveness Soviet strategic air defense forces are discussed in NIE 11-3/8-78.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.