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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Top ec
44. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Com- troop rotation. Training is rigorous and intensive.
munity regarding the success the Soviets have had in Heavy emphasis is placed on political indoctrination
recruiting soldiers into their programs. According to and rote, drill-type training. Weapons training in-
one view,' the Soviets have had little success, at least volves heavy use of simulators and firing subcaliber
through the extended service program, in persuading ammunition. Allocations of ammunition are low and
conscript soldiers to remain in the service. The holders live firing is infrequent. For routine, low-level train-
of this view note the harsh and demanding aspects of ing, units use a small amount of training equipment
Soviet military service and point to the numerous which they have at their disposal in addition to their
reports from defectors, emigre of TO&E (table of organization and equipment) alloca-
morale and disciplinary problems within the armed tions. Night training is given emphasis and includes
forces as the basis for this judgment. They further note road marches, night firing, and tactical exercises.
that there are few extended servicemen listed on the Other areas emphasized include frequent river cross-
available rosters of Soviet ground force units and they ing, rapid movement and maneuver, and operations in
do not see any decline in the number of conscripts a CBR environment, including decontamination and
required as a result of increased numbers of career negotiation of contaminated areas. Field training is
servicemen. frequent. Full-strength Soviet units carry out at least
45. According to an alternative view,' there is not two field training exercises per year at battalion level,
sufficient evidence to support conclusions about the one or two at regimental level, and one at division
planned scope of the warrant officer and extended level. Division-level exercises are often provided with
service personnel programs or Soviet success in imple- tactical aviation support.
menting them. The holders of this view believe that, 47. The training in NSWP forces is generally pat-
by increasing the proportion of career personnel in the terned after the Soviet model with semiannual troop
Soviet ground forces, these programs have the poten- .inductions driving the training cycle. Comparable
tial for significantly raising the level of their combat preinduction training organizations also exist in the
readiness and capabilities. They do not believe that NSWP countries. The quality of training of the north-
there is reliable evidence on Soviet requirements for .ern tier NSWP forces is generally higher than that of
conscript personnel or changes in these requirements their southern counterparts. In some respects, the
and they do not believe that defectors and emigres are quality of training of East German and Czechoslovak
a reliable basis for judging Soviet morale and disci- forces surpasses that of the Soviets. Combined exer-
pline. They believe that available rosters of Soviet cises with the Soviets occurs frequently in the northern
ground force units are not a good indicator of the NSWP countries, occasionally in Hungary, but rarely
current status of Soviet career noncommissioned per- in Bulgaria and Romania.
sonnel programs because these programs were instituted
or revitalized only in 1972 and may not yet have 48. The Soviet officer and his East European coun-
reached their full projected scope. They note that the terpart are selected and promoted on the basis of
conditions of service for career noncommissioned per- professional qualifications and political loyalty. Pact
sonnel are radically different from those for conscripts officers are well educated in military and civil institu-
and are similar to those for officers with respect to tions; we judge them to be technically and militarily
pay, housing, leave, travel, shopping, and other bene- competent as a group. Officers generally serve longer
fits. With a combination of incentives on the one hand tours of duty in one job than their Western counter-
and pressure from the political organization on the parts, allowing them to acquire thorough knowledge of
other, the Soviets should be able to overcome any their jobs. The Soviets are attempting to provide quick
difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and increased responsibility for out-
standing officers.
46. Unit training is conducted during winter and
summer periods scheduled around the semiannual 49. There appear to be some problems with lower
level leadership in the Soviet ground forces. The Soviet
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; military press is replete with criticism of junior offi-
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of cers who do not exert sufficient initiative in trainingStgte; and the Director, National Security Agency.
a The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency; and exercises to provide varied, realistic, and challeng-
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the ing training. In addition, most noncommissioned offi-
Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department cers are conscripts only 18 to 20 years old. However,
of the Air Force. these problems in lower level leadership should be
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.