Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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44. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Com- troop rotation. Training is rigorous and intensive.
munity regarding the success the Soviets have had in Heavy emphasis is placed on political indoctrination
recruiting soldiers into their programs. According to and rote, drill-type training. Weapons training in-
one view,' the Soviets have had little success, at least volves heavy use of simulators and firing subcaliber
through the extended service program, in persuading ammunition. Allocations of ammunition are low and
conscript soldiers to remain in the service. The holders live firing is infrequent. For routine, low-level train-
of this view note the harsh and demanding aspects of ing, units use a small amount of training equipment
Soviet military service and point to the numerous which they have at their disposal in addition to their
reports from defectors, emigre of TO&E (table of organization and equipment) alloca-
morale and disciplinary problems within the armed tions. Night training is given emphasis and includes
forces as the basis for this judgment. They further note road marches, night firing, and tactical exercises.
that there are few extended servicemen listed on the Other areas emphasized include frequent river cross-
available rosters of Soviet ground force units and they ing, rapid movement and maneuver, and operations in
do not see any decline in the number of conscripts a CBR environment, including decontamination and
required as a result of increased numbers of career negotiation of contaminated areas. Field training is
servicemen. frequent. Full-strength Soviet units carry out at least
45. According to an alternative view,' there is not two field training exercises per year at battalion level,
sufficient evidence to support conclusions about the one or two at regimental level, and one at division
planned scope of the warrant officer and extended level. Division-level exercises are often provided with
service personnel programs or Soviet success in imple- tactical aviation support.
menting them. The holders of this view believe that, 47. The training in NSWP forces is generally pat-
by increasing the proportion of career personnel in the terned after the Soviet model with semiannual troop
Soviet ground forces, these programs have the poten- .inductions driving the training cycle. Comparable
tial for significantly raising the level of their combat preinduction training organizations also exist in the
readiness and capabilities. They do not believe that NSWP countries. The quality of training of the north-
there is reliable evidence on Soviet requirements for .ern tier NSWP forces is generally higher than that of
conscript personnel or changes in these requirements their southern counterparts. In some respects, the
and they do not believe that defectors and emigres are quality of training of East German and Czechoslovak
a reliable basis for judging Soviet morale and disci- forces surpasses that of the Soviets. Combined exer-
pline. They believe that available rosters of Soviet cises with the Soviets occurs frequently in the northern
ground force units are not a good indicator of the NSWP countries, occasionally in Hungary, but rarely
current status of Soviet career noncommissioned per- in Bulgaria and Romania.
sonnel programs because these programs were instituted
or revitalized only in 1972 and may not yet have 48. The Soviet officer and his East European coun-
reached their full projected scope. They note that the terpart are selected and promoted on the basis of
conditions of service for career noncommissioned per- professional qualifications and political loyalty. Pact
sonnel are radically different from those for conscripts officers are well educated in military and civil institu-
and are similar to those for officers with respect to tions; we judge them to be technically and militarily
pay, housing, leave, travel, shopping, and other bene- competent as a group. Officers generally serve longer
fits. With a combination of incentives on the one hand tours of duty in one job than their Western counter-
and pressure from the political organization on the parts, allowing them to acquire thorough knowledge of
other, the Soviets should be able to overcome any their jobs. The Soviets are attempting to provide quick
difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and increased responsibility for out-
standing officers.
46. Unit training is conducted during winter and
summer periods scheduled around the semiannual 49. There appear to be some problems with lower
level leadership in the Soviet ground forces. The Soviet
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; military press is replete with criticism of junior offi-
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of cers who do not exert sufficient initiative in trainingStgte; and the Director, National Security Agency.
a The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency; and exercises to provide varied, realistic, and challeng-
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the ing training. In addition, most noncommissioned offi-
Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department cers are conscripts only 18 to 20 years old. However,
of the Air Force. these problems in lower level leadership should be
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