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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
Top ec
44. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Com- troop rotation. Training is rigorous and intensive.
munity regarding the success the Soviets have had in Heavy emphasis is placed on political indoctrination
recruiting soldiers into their programs. According to and rote, drill-type training. Weapons training in-
one view,' the Soviets have had little success, at least volves heavy use of simulators and firing subcaliber
through the extended service program, in persuading ammunition. Allocations of ammunition are low and
conscript soldiers to remain in the service. The holders live firing is infrequent. For routine, low-level train-
of this view note the harsh and demanding aspects of ing, units use a small amount of training equipment
Soviet military service and point to the numerous which they have at their disposal in addition to their
reports from defectors, emigre of TO&E (table of organization and equipment) alloca-
morale and disciplinary problems within the armed tions. Night training is given emphasis and includes
forces as the basis for this judgment. They further note road marches, night firing, and tactical exercises.
that there are few extended servicemen listed on the Other areas emphasized include frequent river cross-
available rosters of Soviet ground force units and they ing, rapid movement and maneuver, and operations in
do not see any decline in the number of conscripts a CBR environment, including decontamination and
required as a result of increased numbers of career negotiation of contaminated areas. Field training is
servicemen. frequent. Full-strength Soviet units carry out at least
45. According to an alternative view,' there is not two field training exercises per year at battalion level,
sufficient evidence to support conclusions about the one or two at regimental level, and one at division
planned scope of the warrant officer and extended level. Division-level exercises are often provided with
service personnel programs or Soviet success in imple- tactical aviation support.
menting them. The holders of this view believe that, 47. The training in NSWP forces is generally pat-
by increasing the proportion of career personnel in the terned after the Soviet model with semiannual troop
Soviet ground forces, these programs have the poten- .inductions driving the training cycle. Comparable
tial for significantly raising the level of their combat preinduction training organizations also exist in the
readiness and capabilities. They do not believe that NSWP countries. The quality of training of the north-
there is reliable evidence on Soviet requirements for .ern tier NSWP forces is generally higher than that of
conscript personnel or changes in these requirements their southern counterparts. In some respects, the
and they do not believe that defectors and emigres are quality of training of East German and Czechoslovak
a reliable basis for judging Soviet morale and disci- forces surpasses that of the Soviets. Combined exer-
pline. They believe that available rosters of Soviet cises with the Soviets occurs frequently in the northern
ground force units are not a good indicator of the NSWP countries, occasionally in Hungary, but rarely
current status of Soviet career noncommissioned per- in Bulgaria and Romania.
sonnel programs because these programs were instituted
or revitalized only in 1972 and may not yet have 48. The Soviet officer and his East European coun-
reached their full projected scope. They note that the terpart are selected and promoted on the basis of
conditions of service for career noncommissioned per- professional qualifications and political loyalty. Pact
sonnel are radically different from those for conscripts officers are well educated in military and civil institu-
and are similar to those for officers with respect to tions; we judge them to be technically and militarily
pay, housing, leave, travel, shopping, and other bene- competent as a group. Officers generally serve longer
fits. With a combination of incentives on the one hand tours of duty in one job than their Western counter-
and pressure from the political organization on the parts, allowing them to acquire thorough knowledge of
other, the Soviets should be able to overcome any their jobs. The Soviets are attempting to provide quick
difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and increased responsibility for out-
standing officers.
46. Unit training is conducted during winter and
summer periods scheduled around the semiannual 49. There appear to be some problems with lower
level leadership in the Soviet ground forces. The Soviet
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; military press is replete with criticism of junior offi-
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of cers who do not exert sufficient initiative in trainingStgte; and the Director, National Security Agency.
a The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency; and exercises to provide varied, realistic, and challeng-
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the ing training. In addition, most noncommissioned offi-
Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department cers are conscripts only 18 to 20 years old. However,
of the Air Force. these problems in lower level leadership should be
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.