Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped Soviet airborne division (7,300 men), or inventory usually requires a more highly trained the combat assault elements of two divisions, could be soldier to operate or maintain it. Because the con- lifted. NSWP airborne units have virtually no lift script's term of service is now two years, the Soviets capabilities of their own, and depend almost entirely are faced with the requirement to provide more on Soviet VTA for this purpose. training in less time for their largely conscript army. This has prompted the Soviets to modify their training Special Operations Units system to include increased emphasis on preinduction training, individual specialist training, and intensified 38. The Soviets have units which they refer to as unit training. special operations brigades. These are tasked to carry 42. The training of Soviet soldiers begins before out long-range reconnaissance and sabotage against their induction into the armed forces. Compulsory such targets as nuclear weapons facilities, airfields, depots, air defense installations. and command aid preinduction training, which is prescribed by the eotso facilities. Peacetime strengths of the units are Soviet 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, is believed to range from about 250 men to several times given either in secondary schools, in the professional thaelige Thy an e ompbose of ane toumeraf tes and technical education system, or at places of work. Itthat figure. They are com osed of a number of teams includes a 140-hour basic training course designed towhose strength may vary from three to 15 men, familiarize youths with the armed forces and provide psychological preparation for military service. Tactical 39. We have identified one of these units in East field training is conducted in summer camps and Germany and several in the western military districts includes weapons familiarization and live firing, of the USSR. Similar units also exist in all NSWP marches, and tactical drills. Many specialists for the countries. Virtually all members of these units receive armed forces also receive some training by the parachute training and some instruction in demolition Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Navy, and foreign language. Some are known to be trained as and Air. Force (DOSAAF), the Soviet preinduction frogmen. There are reports indicating that the teams training organization. These specialists, who have com- may wear civilian clothes or the uniforms of NATO pleted their compulsory preinduction training, receive member countries. additional training in such fields as aviation, scuba diving, parachuting, vehicle operation and mainten- ance, radio/radar operation, and electronics. A recent Soviet article stated that a third of the conscripts 40. Pact armed forces depend heavily on universal received specialized military-technical training in the conscription to meet military manpower require- DOSAAF. ments. In the USSR, conscripts make up roughly 75 percent of total active strength. Terms of service vary 43. After induction into the armed forces, approxi- by nation and branch of service but generally are two mately one-fourth to one-half of all conscripts are sent or three years in length. The Soviets induct their to training units or schools for six months of NCO or conscripts semiannually, usually for a two-year term spcialist training in such areas as tank gunnery and of service. The induction of new Soviet conscripts, the radio operation. On completion of their courses, sot- release of those whose terms of service have expired desji hi nt uigtenx ro oain reeasenfthseime to s ofserce hades i Conscripts not assigned to training units or schools areand the assignment to units of the graduates of sn ietyt hi nt hr hyrcieapoi noncommissioned officer (NCO) and specialist train- sent directly to their unit, where they receive approxi- ing courses all occur during the semiannual induction mately four weeks of basic training, after which they periods in May and November. This massive turnover, participate in regular unit training. In addition, the at times as much as one third of unit strength, cause Soviets are making an effort to retain skilled enlisted considerable disruption. There is a major reduction in specialists. In 1972 the rank of warrant officer (pra- training and exercise activity while troop rotation is porshchik) was introduced into the ground forces and under way. Approximately 125,000 troops are rotated strong efforts were made to recruit enlisted men as every six rnonths in the Groups of Forces in Eastern warrant officers. The program for extended service EveroyesNCOs (sverkhsrochnik) was dropped in 1972 when the rank of warrant officer was introduced, but was iL. The Soviets have upgraded their ground force reinstated a year later in order to retain highly trained training in recent years as a result of two factors. The soldiers. |I-13 Top ~LC
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.