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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the
fully equipped Soviet airborne division (7,300 men), or inventory usually requires a more highly trained
the combat assault elements of two divisions, could be soldier to operate or maintain it. Because the con-
lifted. NSWP airborne units have virtually no lift script's term of service is now two years, the Soviets
capabilities of their own, and depend almost entirely are faced with the requirement to provide more
on Soviet VTA for this purpose. training in less time for their largely conscript army.
This has prompted the Soviets to modify their training
Special Operations Units system to include increased emphasis on preinduction
training, individual specialist training, and intensified
38. The Soviets have units which they refer to as unit training.
special operations brigades. These are tasked to carry 42. The training of Soviet soldiers begins before
out long-range reconnaissance and sabotage against their induction into the armed forces. Compulsory
such targets as nuclear weapons facilities, airfields,
depots, air defense installations. and command aid preinduction training, which is prescribed by the
eotso facilities. Peacetime strengths of the units are Soviet 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, is
believed to range from about 250 men to several times given either in secondary schools, in the professional
thaelige Thy an e ompbose of ane toumeraf tes and technical education system, or at places of work. Itthat figure. They are com osed of a number of teams includes a 140-hour basic training course designed towhose strength may vary from three to 15 men, familiarize youths with the armed forces and provide
psychological preparation for military service. Tactical
39. We have identified one of these units in East field training is conducted in summer camps and
Germany and several in the western military districts includes weapons familiarization and live firing,
of the USSR. Similar units also exist in all NSWP marches, and tactical drills. Many specialists for the
countries. Virtually all members of these units receive armed forces also receive some training by the
parachute training and some instruction in demolition Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Navy,
and foreign language. Some are known to be trained as and Air. Force (DOSAAF), the Soviet preinduction
frogmen. There are reports indicating that the teams training organization. These specialists, who have com-
may wear civilian clothes or the uniforms of NATO pleted their compulsory preinduction training, receive
member countries. additional training in such fields as aviation, scuba
diving, parachuting, vehicle operation and mainten-
ance, radio/radar operation, and electronics. A recent
Soviet article stated that a third of the conscripts
40. Pact armed forces depend heavily on universal received specialized military-technical training in the
conscription to meet military manpower require- DOSAAF.
ments. In the USSR, conscripts make up roughly 75
percent of total active strength. Terms of service vary 43. After induction into the armed forces, approxi-
by nation and branch of service but generally are two mately one-fourth to one-half of all conscripts are sent
or three years in length. The Soviets induct their to training units or schools for six months of NCO or
conscripts semiannually, usually for a two-year term spcialist training in such areas as tank gunnery and
of service. The induction of new Soviet conscripts, the radio operation. On completion of their courses, sot-
release of those whose terms of service have expired desji hi nt uigtenx ro oain
reeasenfthseime to s ofserce hades i Conscripts not assigned to training units or schools areand the assignment to units of the graduates of sn ietyt hi nt hr hyrcieapoi
noncommissioned officer (NCO) and specialist train- sent directly to their unit, where they receive approxi-
ing courses all occur during the semiannual induction mately four weeks of basic training, after which they
periods in May and November. This massive turnover, participate in regular unit training. In addition, the
at times as much as one third of unit strength, cause Soviets are making an effort to retain skilled enlisted
considerable disruption. There is a major reduction in specialists. In 1972 the rank of warrant officer (pra-
training and exercise activity while troop rotation is porshchik) was introduced into the ground forces and
under way. Approximately 125,000 troops are rotated strong efforts were made to recruit enlisted men as
every six rnonths in the Groups of Forces in Eastern warrant officers. The program for extended service
EveroyesNCOs (sverkhsrochnik) was dropped in 1972 when the
rank of warrant officer was introduced, but was
iL. The Soviets have upgraded their ground force reinstated a year later in order to retain highly trained
training in recent years as a result of two factors. The soldiers.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.