Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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- Category II: These divisions also have a full Soviet and 2 million NSWP military personnel were
complement of combat equipment, but frequently released from active duty and constitute a ready
lack some support equipment. Assigned person- reserve to flesh out understrength units upon mobiliza-
nel strengths vary from about one-third of tion. In addition, the Pact countries have earmarked a
authorized wartime strength in some NSWP large number of civilian trucking entities for wartime
divisions to about two-thirds in Soviet divisions. use by the military. Similar arrangements exist for
These divisions could probably mobilize reserve medical units that would be formed from civilian
personnel and equipment and begin movement hospitals, An unknown number of Soviet civilian
within about 48 hours, with selected elements reservists employed within the Soviet Groups of Forces
moving even more rapidly. Their initial combat are also reservists earmarked for such mobilization fill.
effectiveness would be lower than that of Cate- if available in large numbers they could permit the
gory I divisions. Soviets to meet their most immediate manpower
Category III: 'These divisions are manned at requirements in a matter of hours. In an exercise in- CaeoyIIhs iiin r anda the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) in
cadre strength with manpower levels ranging
from1974, the time required for these reservists to report to
their designated units was from four to six hours.
wartime personnel. They apparently have most
of their essential combat equipment, except 35. Organizations and elements at army and front
APCs, but have less support equipment than level, particularly rear service units, require longer to
Category Ii divisions. Category III divisions gen- mobilize than the combat units which they support. In
erally would require 72 hours or more to mobi- addition, significant portions of the Soviet and other
lize reserve personnel and equipment and begin Pact rear services required for wartime operations do
movement. Their initial combat effectiveness not exist in peacetime. Major elements, such as medi-
would be lower than Category II divisions.. cal and transport units, would have to be mobilized
- Mobilization Divisions: In addition to the above from the civilian economy.
categories of active divisions, the Soviets have a Airborne Forces
number of mobilization divisions. In peacetime
these divisions consist only of small staff and 36. In addition to tank and motorized rifle units
cadre elements. They would be equipped during intended for theater war, the Pact also maintains large
mobilization from equipment stockpiled in divi- airborne forces. These forces, which have remained
sional sets and manned from pools of reservists or relatively constant in numbers over the past decade,
designated personnel. We estimate that these include eight Soviet divisions (one is a training divi-
divisions would require several weeks of prepara- sion), one Polish division, and smaller units in each of
tion before they would be ready for service, the other non-Soviet countries. Soviet airborne divi-
possibly in a rear area security role or as replen- sions are centrally controlled by Airborne Troops
ishinents for the general reserve. The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic
maintain a total of 15 such divisions in the USSR reserves of the Supreme High Command (VGK).
opposite NATO, and the NSWP countries have Soviet airborne divisions could be used in a variety of
.10 or I. wartime situations ranging from operations under the
33. All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions.
zatio syste t ns hai w llrganzdrstr h- The Soviet divisions also have important potential useszation systems that can rapidlly fill understrength
ground units with personnel and equipment from the other than war in Europe, such as intervention in
. . .Third World areas.civilian economy. These systems are built around a
network of local committees which maintain lists of 37. Soviet airborne division command and control,
reservists and civilian equipment and which are in- ground mobility, and antitank capabilities have been
tended to contact, assemble, and deliver these re- improved with the introduction of new equipment,
sources rapidly to the local military units. The system although this additional equipment has placed an
has not been tested on a broad scale, although local added burden on the Soviets' limited airlift resources.
tests occur often. If all the current assets of Soviet Military Transport
34. The base of personnel and equipment. in the *See National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-79 for details of Soviet
Pact economies is adequate to support Pact mobiliza- capabilities for projecting military power and influence in distant
tion plans. During the past five years, about 5 million areas.
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