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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
cal, radiological) protective system to allow operations missiles on the same vehicle-a characteristic which
in a toxic or radioactive environment. provides greater operational flexibility.
19. Variants of the BMP are also entering the Soviet 24. Replacement of the S-60 gun system with SA-6s
ground forces in increasing numbers. These include and SA-8s has proceeded much more rapidly in Soviet
the M-1974 command vehicle, the M-1975 surveil- forces in Eastern Europe than in those in the USSR or
lance vehicle, and the M-1976 reconnaissance vehicle, NSWP forces. Two-thirds of Soviet tank and motor-
which is replacing the PT-76, the only light tank in ized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe have been
service. The BMD, a lightly armored, airdromppahle, equipped with one or another of these systems. (See
assault vehicle is assigned to Soviet airborne divisions. table II-2.) Only about 10 percent of Soviet divisions in
It is amphibious and has the same weapons as the the USSR and four NSWP divisions have SA-6s,
larger 3MP, plus two additional machineguns. however, and no SA-8s have been fielded yet with
20. The NSWP ground forces are on the whole still non-Soviet forces. SA-6 regiments have been deployed
predlomiantly equipped with older A PCs. The East at army level, however, in most NSWP countries. S-60
German, Czechoslovak, and Polish ground forces, guns replaced by mobile SAMs may be reorganized
German,~~~~~~~~~ mzcolvkn ois rudfre, ito AA units for additional air defense of fronts orhowever, have large numbers of the more modern armies.
APCs, including some 1,600 BMPs and several thou-
sand BTR-60s or a Czechoslovak/Polish-manufactured 25. Pact ground forces are also equipped with the
equivalent. Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria are SA-7 Grail and SA-9 Gaskin missile systems. The SA-7
largely equipped with older APCs. Overall, the NSWP is fielded at the company level. It is a man-portable
ground forces have about 11,000 APCs. system with an infrared homing missile and is de-
21. Ground Force Air Defense Systems. Pact Table II-2
ground forces opposite NATO are equipped with a
variety of tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) and Status of Air Defense Modernization in
antiaircraft (AA) gun systems. A program to replace Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions
gun systems and older SAMs with more mobile SAM Opposite NATO a
systems was begun in the late 1.960s and continues, January 1979
with Soviet units in Eastern Europe and along the -
Sino-Soviet border receiving highest priority. Upgrad- Equipped With
ing of the remaining Soviet units and of the NSWP
forces is proceeding more slowly. Divisions b SA-6 SA-8 AA
Soviet
22. The SA-4 Ganef, a long-range, medium-to-high- In Eastern Europe 31 19 5 7
altitude SAM system (see figure II-5), has replaced the In the USSR 72 7 1 64
older, less mobile SA-2 Guideline in Soviet front- and Total 103 26 6 71
army-level organizations. The SA-4 system represents
a maior improvement over the SA-2 because it has NSWPd
EatGermany 6 3 - 3
twice the range and each launcher has two missiles East Germany13 - - 13
available for refire. It has begun to appear in the Czechoslovakia 10 - - 10
inventories of Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish Hungary 6 1 - 5
forces as well, but in fewer numbers. Each of these Romania 10 - - 10
forces has deployed only one SA-4 brigade. The SA-3 Bulgaria 6 - - 6
Goa is still fielded with Soviet ground forces in the Total 51 4 47
forward area for point defense of airfields. _---- _- ---------- --__
Grand Total 154 30 6 118
23. The SA-6 Gainful and SA-8 Gecko systems are -Seefootnote to table II-1, following paragraph 3.
designed to replace the S-60 57-mm AA gun as b Does not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA-6 is a Division.
mobile, medium-range, low-to--medium altitude sys- . Most combat-ready and some reduced-strength or cadre divi-
tem. The SA-8 is a highly mobile, low-altitude system sions are also equipped with SA-9s and the ZSU-23-4 gun systems.
wvith approximately one-half the maximum missile All Pact divisions probably have the man-portable SA-7.ritane o imelyAf T heSA-8muismuniiu e amongPact Does not include nine army-level SA-6 regiments in Polish,rantge of the SA-6. The SA-8 is unique among Pact Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian ground forces.
SAM systems in that it carries both its radar and s--
11-7
oTp-Se et

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.