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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
7. The Soviets are aware of the improved technol- 322 and in Soviet motorized rifle divisions from 188 to
ogy and growing numbers of NATO antitank weapons 214. Those Soviet motorized rifle divisions opposite
and have demonstrated this awareness by modifying NATO which have independent tank battalions have
their forces and tactics to counter the antitank threat. as many as 265 tanks.'
As in earlier Soviet responses to changing perceptions 13. Artillery. In all, the Pact has assigned about
of battlefield conditions, such adjustments have not led 18,200 artillery pieces of 122-mm or larger to its
to any diminution of the tank forces, or any major ground forces opposite NATO. Of these, some 8,800
change in the way the Soviets see these tank forces (3,600 Soviet, 5,200 NSWP) are located in Eastern
performing. Indeed, they have made even further Europe. Pact artillery is still predominantly towed but
increases to their tank strength and have begun pro- is being improved by the addition of four new self-
pcing newtank models,ropelled models and a new multiple rocket launcher.
8. The mainstay of the Pact ground forces is the The Soviets are continuing to replace the towed 122-
medium tank. In all, Pact forces opposite NATO mm howitzers with self-propelled models in their
have about 45,000 medium tanks at their disposal. motorized rifle regiments. The new 152-mm self-
Of these about 25,000 (10,500 Soviet, 14,500 propelled howitzer also is continuing to enter the
NSWP) are located in Eastern Europe. Soviet inventory. Thus far, it has replaced older towed pieces
forces are equipped with a mix of T-54/55, T-62, in the artillery regiments of several Soviet motorized
T-64, and T-72 models, while the NSWP armies rifle and tank divisions and at least one artillery
rely almost exclusively on the T-54/55 series, with division. Because the self-propelled weapons provide
some T-34s still in the active forces. The T-55, superior cross-country mobility and protection for
which was first manufactured in 1958, is still in their crews, they are better suited to support fast-
production; production of the T-62 ended in 1975. moving armored attacks. (See figure II-3.)
9. In the last few years, two new tanks, the T-64 14. A new 203-mm self-propelled gun and a new
and T-72, have been issued to Soviet ground forces. 240-mm self-propelled mortar are being deployed in
Both tanks incorporate better armor protection, a 125- heavy artillery brigades in the USSR as replacements
mm smoothbore gun, an automatic loading system, for their older towed predecessors. Both systems are
and an electro-optic, possibly laser, rangefinder. (See capable of firing nuclear rounds and, although neither
figure II-2.) Both tanks also have a stabilizing system has yet been sighted outside the USSR, we estimate
on the main gun enabling the tank crew to aim and that they will be deployed eventually with Soviet
fire on the move, forces in Eastern Europe.'
10. The T-64 is assigned both to Soviet units in the 15. A 16-tube multiple rocket launcher of about
USSR and to those in Eastern Europe. Some 4,500 to 240-mm caliber has been fielded with the Soviet
6,000 T-64 tanks have been produced, of which about artillery division in East Germany. We have identified
2,600 are in Eastern Europe. Some 6,000 T-72s have 36 launchers thus far. If fielded in quantity, this
been produced thus far. All have been assigned to weapon would increase Pact capabilities for massed
Soviet units in the USSR. Thus far, however, only fire support during conventional operations. Soviet
about 1,200 T-72s have been confirmed with Soviet
units in the military districts of the USSR opposite a There are varying estimates of the number of Soviet motorized
NATO. rifle divisions which currently have independent tank battalions
(ITBs). According to one estimate, about two-thirds of Soviet
11. The T-72, or an improved version, probably motorized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe have ITBs but few, if
will be the main production tank well into the any, divisions in the western USSR do. This is the view of the
Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence
1980s. The T-72 is heavier than its predecessors but Agency; and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
is faster and quieter, and has a lower silhouette than Department of State. Another view is that all Soviet motorized
the T-54/55 or T-62. It also has an improved suspen- rifle divisions in Eastern Europe currently have ITBs. The holders
sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director, National Security Agency; the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army;
diesel engine, and composite or laminated armor and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
designed to provide increased protection against Air Force. The latter two further believe that, for planning
high-explosive antitank (HEAT) warheads. purposes, all Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the USSR also
would, when committed to combat, have ITBs.
12. Since the late 1960s the number of medium s For a more detailed discussion of Soviet nuclear artillery, see
tanks in Soviet tank divisions has increased from 313 to paragraphs-161 and 162 in this chapter.
11-3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.