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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Trends in Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Figure lI-1
in Central Europe, 1969 and 1979
Manpower
- 1969
1979
0 250,000 500,000 750,000 1,000,000
Equipment
20,000 Tanks
15,000
10,000 ,
- Light Tanks, APCs, Other
Major Antitank Weapons Armored Fighting Vehicles Artillery s
5,000
1969 1979 1969 1979 1969 1979 1969 1979
Includes all ATGMs, and all Includes the PT-76 and the Includes all artillery pieces and Includes medium and heavy
antitank guns and recoilless BMP. . multiple rocket launchers tanks
rifles with maximum effective greater than 100 mm.
ranges greater than 500 meters.
Does not include BMP-mounted
weapons.
577620 1-79 CIA
combat vehicles, support equipment, and weapons of Soviet production and design, the share produced
designed to increase mobility and provide greater, by the NSWP countries is increasing.
more accurate firepower. Despite impressive modern- 6. Tanks. Armor has dominated Pact ground forces
ization programs, however, Pact ground forces retain a 'for the past several decades. During the decade before
mixture of old and new equipment. Although Pact the mid-1960s, when Soviet military planners believed
forces are considerably more standardized than that war in Europe could be nuclear from the outset,
NATO's, items such as T-34 and T-54/55 tanks, the the survivability of armored forces underscored their
BTR-152 and earlier models of BTR-60 armored value relative to other ground forces. In the late 1960s,
personnel carriers, and various older models of field when these planners were forced to contend with the
artillery and antiaircraft guns, are still operational and possibility of both a conventional and a nuclear con-
contribute to a growing diversity within the Pact flict, armored forces were still believed to offer maxi-
weapons inventory. Although most Pact equipment is mum flexibility.
11-2

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.