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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
CHAPTER II
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR THEATER WARFARE
1 Warsaw Pact forces for operations against NATO Table II-1
can best be described in terms of major groupings: Warsaw Pact Ground Force Manpower
Ground, tactical air, and air defense forces in Opposite NATO *
Eastern Europe and in the military districts of January 1979
the USSR opposite NATO, and possibly these Soviet NSWP Total
types of forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and
Turkestan Military Districts. East Germany 365,000 106,000 471,000
Poland 35,000 232,000 267,000
Czechoslovakia 68,000 143,000 211,000
-- Naval forces of the three Soviet European fleets Hungary 59,000 72,000 131,000
and the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) Bulgaria - 105,000 105,000
countries. Romania - 140,000 140,000
USSR 553,000 - 553,000
- Most medium- and intermediate-range and some Total 1,080,000 798,000 1,878,000
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces. *Includes Soviet and East European forces in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and Soviet forces in the Baltic,
- Most interinediate-range and some long-range Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus,
bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation. and Transcaucasus Military Districts of the USSR. This note applies
to all the tables in chapter 1t.
2. Pact forces opposite NATO are predominantly SECET
Soviet, but NSWP forces make a significant contribu-
tion and indeed are critical to Soviet strategy for 4. Since the late 1960s, overall Pact ground force
conflict in Europe. Since the mid-1960s both Soviet manpower has increased substantially. Pact forces in
and NSWP forces have been characterized by a Central Europe-where our information is best-have
growth in manpower and equipment and by modern- increased more than the forces opposite NATO's
ization programs to improve their capabilities. Overall, flanks. Ground force manpower in the Soviet Groups
the changes of the past decade or so have made these of Forces in Central Europe, for example, has expand-
forces more balanced and operationally flexible, with ed by some 75,000 men since the late 1960s, while the
improved capabilities for both nuclear and nonnuclear East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak ground forces
warfare. have registered an increase of 65,000 men.' About
three-fourths of this increase took place before 1973.
A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Figure II-1 depicts several important trends in War-
saw Pact ground forces in Central Europe.
Manpower Equipment
3. Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite NATO
number about 1.9 million men. The Soviet Union 5. Pact ground forces are well equipped with weap-
accounts for roughly half of the total or just over 1 ons either of Soviet origin or patterned after Soviet
million men. About half of these Soviet forces are models. The equipment inventory is being continually
stationed in Eastern Europe and half in the military modernized with the introduction of new, improved
districts of the USSR that are opposite NATO. The size ,The transfer of some Polish territorial forces to the active
and distribution of these forces are shown in table Il-1. ground forces accounts for a portion of this increase.
TI- t

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.