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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
CHAPTER II
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR THEATER WARFARE
1 Warsaw Pact forces for operations against NATO Table II-1
can best be described in terms of major groupings: Warsaw Pact Ground Force Manpower
Ground, tactical air, and air defense forces in Opposite NATO *
Eastern Europe and in the military districts of January 1979
the USSR opposite NATO, and possibly these Soviet NSWP Total
types of forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and
Turkestan Military Districts. East Germany 365,000 106,000 471,000
Poland 35,000 232,000 267,000
Czechoslovakia 68,000 143,000 211,000
-- Naval forces of the three Soviet European fleets Hungary 59,000 72,000 131,000
and the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) Bulgaria - 105,000 105,000
countries. Romania - 140,000 140,000
USSR 553,000 - 553,000
- Most medium- and intermediate-range and some Total 1,080,000 798,000 1,878,000
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces. *Includes Soviet and East European forces in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and Soviet forces in the Baltic,
- Most interinediate-range and some long-range Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus,
bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation. and Transcaucasus Military Districts of the USSR. This note applies
to all the tables in chapter 1t.
2. Pact forces opposite NATO are predominantly SECET
Soviet, but NSWP forces make a significant contribu-
tion and indeed are critical to Soviet strategy for 4. Since the late 1960s, overall Pact ground force
conflict in Europe. Since the mid-1960s both Soviet manpower has increased substantially. Pact forces in
and NSWP forces have been characterized by a Central Europe-where our information is best-have
growth in manpower and equipment and by modern- increased more than the forces opposite NATO's
ization programs to improve their capabilities. Overall, flanks. Ground force manpower in the Soviet Groups
the changes of the past decade or so have made these of Forces in Central Europe, for example, has expand-
forces more balanced and operationally flexible, with ed by some 75,000 men since the late 1960s, while the
improved capabilities for both nuclear and nonnuclear East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak ground forces
warfare. have registered an increase of 65,000 men.' About
three-fourths of this increase took place before 1973.
A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Figure II-1 depicts several important trends in War-
saw Pact ground forces in Central Europe.
Manpower Equipment
3. Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite NATO
number about 1.9 million men. The Soviet Union 5. Pact ground forces are well equipped with weap-
accounts for roughly half of the total or just over 1 ons either of Soviet origin or patterned after Soviet
million men. About half of these Soviet forces are models. The equipment inventory is being continually
stationed in Eastern Europe and half in the military modernized with the introduction of new, improved
districts of the USSR that are opposite NATO. The size ,The transfer of some Polish territorial forces to the active
and distribution of these forces are shown in table Il-1. ground forces accounts for a portion of this increase.
TI- t

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.