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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
CHAPTER II
WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR THEATER WARFARE
1 Warsaw Pact forces for operations against NATO Table II-1
can best be described in terms of major groupings: Warsaw Pact Ground Force Manpower
Ground, tactical air, and air defense forces in Opposite NATO *
Eastern Europe and in the military districts of January 1979
the USSR opposite NATO, and possibly these Soviet NSWP Total
types of forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and
Turkestan Military Districts. East Germany 365,000 106,000 471,000
Poland 35,000 232,000 267,000
Czechoslovakia 68,000 143,000 211,000
-- Naval forces of the three Soviet European fleets Hungary 59,000 72,000 131,000
and the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) Bulgaria - 105,000 105,000
countries. Romania - 140,000 140,000
USSR 553,000 - 553,000
- Most medium- and intermediate-range and some Total 1,080,000 798,000 1,878,000
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces. *Includes Soviet and East European forces in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and Soviet forces in the Baltic,
- Most interinediate-range and some long-range Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus,
bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation. and Transcaucasus Military Districts of the USSR. This note applies
to all the tables in chapter 1t.
2. Pact forces opposite NATO are predominantly SECET
Soviet, but NSWP forces make a significant contribu-
tion and indeed are critical to Soviet strategy for 4. Since the late 1960s, overall Pact ground force
conflict in Europe. Since the mid-1960s both Soviet manpower has increased substantially. Pact forces in
and NSWP forces have been characterized by a Central Europe-where our information is best-have
growth in manpower and equipment and by modern- increased more than the forces opposite NATO's
ization programs to improve their capabilities. Overall, flanks. Ground force manpower in the Soviet Groups
the changes of the past decade or so have made these of Forces in Central Europe, for example, has expand-
forces more balanced and operationally flexible, with ed by some 75,000 men since the late 1960s, while the
improved capabilities for both nuclear and nonnuclear East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak ground forces
warfare. have registered an increase of 65,000 men.' About
three-fourths of this increase took place before 1973.
A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Figure II-1 depicts several important trends in War-
saw Pact ground forces in Central Europe.
Manpower Equipment
3. Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite NATO
number about 1.9 million men. The Soviet Union 5. Pact ground forces are well equipped with weap-
accounts for roughly half of the total or just over 1 ons either of Soviet origin or patterned after Soviet
million men. About half of these Soviet forces are models. The equipment inventory is being continually
stationed in Eastern Europe and half in the military modernized with the introduction of new, improved
districts of the USSR that are opposite NATO. The size ,The transfer of some Polish territorial forces to the active
and distribution of these forces are shown in table Il-1. ground forces accounts for a portion of this increase.
TI- t

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.