Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Top
41. Since the late 1960s the Pact has adopted a for ammunition and fuel imposed by changed tactical
standardized command and control doctrine and has organization and doctrine and partly to increase the
begun to modernize its command and control proce- combat endurance of the forces in either nuclear or
dures and equipment. Providing impetus to Pact conventional war.
efforts to improve command and control are the
technological improvements in communication sys- 43. Pact theater forces have emerged from a dc-
tems andt thete growingcomleit ofegefutur combattes and the growing complexity of future combat ade of change with their fundamental orientation on
caused by the proliferation of modern weapon the tank intact, but with a more balanced structure for
systems. conventional war and with both conventional and
42. Pact ground force logistic capacity has also been nuclear firepower greatly increased. These changes,
improved, notably by large additions to motor trans- along with an infusion of more modern technology,
port and the development of improved support organi- have made Soviet theater forces competitive with
zations and equipment. These improvements have leading Western armies in sophistication of organiza-
been made partly to support the increased demands. tion and equipment.
-11
Top
_J

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.