Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top t 33. The Soviets have accurate information on threatening being their ability to attack rear area and NATO order of battle, command and control arrange- coastal targets and to counter Pact naval forces. ments, alert procedures, and readiness categories. They have knowledge of Western mobilization plans G. Implications for Pact Forces and plans to transfer combat forces from the United 37. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear States to Europe. They know the nature of the forces phase of hostilities and their recognition of a need for earmarked for such deployment, the scheduling of the strong conventional forces even in the event of nuclear transfer, and the mission of these forces in the early war, the Soviets have sought to improve their conven- phases of a war. They estimate that the United States tional force capabilities. Since the late 1960s they have could quickly augment the tactical air forces in significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery, Europe and deploy as many as four additional aircraft armed helicopters, and air defenses. They have been carriers to the European theater. They are extremely*-equipping their tactical air forces with aircraft possess- conservative in evaluating NATO's combat potential ing increased performance and load-carrying capacity. During this period the flexibility and conventional war and sometimes ascribe exaggerated capabilities to potential of Soviet naval forces also have been marked- NATO.poetaofSvenaafocsashaebemakd ly improved by the acquistition of more capable 34. The Soviets view NATO's nuclear arsenal as the surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, primary threat to Warsaw Pact forces. They credit replenishment ships, and aircraft. NATO with a large inventory of nuclear weapons and 38. The increase in conventional firepower in the delivery systems which include various types of air- ground and air forces has especially enhanced the craft, artillery, and tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Pact's ability to overcome organized NATO defenses They appreciate that the mobility, survivability, and in the absence of the nuclear strikes which formerly flexibility of these systems make them difficult to were relied upon to blast holes for the passage of combat effectively. They see a continuing trend to- armored striking forces in the opening phase of a European var. Pact ward the modernization and improvement of these stress the special importance of artillery in the break- weapon systems. They have grave concerns about through phase when a nuclear strike is not employed development of the cruise missile with its potential for initially. The added firepower also increases the Pact's significantly increasing NATO's nuclear strike capabi- capability to destroy NATO's nuclear delivery systems lity. They are also concerned about the enhanced and warhead stockpiles during a conventional phase, radiation warhead which they contend will lower the which is emphasized in Soviet tactical doctrine. nuclear threshold in Europe. e t39. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to 35. Areas in which the Soviets consider NATO increase the size of their theater nuclear forces and significant improve their flexibility. Since the early 1970s they include the impressive and improving capabilities of have introduced nuclear artillery systems, increased incd ttheir surface-to-surface tactical missile launchers in NATO's antitank defenses and the continuing modern- Central Europe, assigned nuclear missions to addition- ization of NATO's tactical air forces. These factors are al tactical aviation units, and are deploying a new assessed by the Soviets as having substantially im- generation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and proved NATO's conventional forces, although they a new bomber. The Soviet Navy has also added still believe that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces systems which improve its capability to wage theater have made relatively more progress in improving their nuclear war. overall conventional capabilities. 40. At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval forces on NATO's flanks in the Mediter- ranean and elsewhere since the late 1960s also have of NATO's navies, particularly the carrier strike implications for the Pact's potential strategies for forces, ballistic missile and antisubmarine submarines, conflict in the European theater. Those Soviet naval and amphibious assault forces. They see geography as units which are continuously deployed forward on the favoring NATO's naval power. The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions and capabilities to NATO's a conventional or theater nuclear context, especially at fleets in either a conventional or nuclear war, the most the outset of hostilities. 1-10 T rSeere4-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.