Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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33. The Soviets have accurate information on threatening being their ability to attack rear area and
NATO order of battle, command and control arrange- coastal targets and to counter Pact naval forces.
ments, alert procedures, and readiness categories.
They have knowledge of Western mobilization plans G. Implications for Pact Forces
and plans to transfer combat forces from the United 37. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear
States to Europe. They know the nature of the forces phase of hostilities and their recognition of a need for
earmarked for such deployment, the scheduling of the strong conventional forces even in the event of nuclear
transfer, and the mission of these forces in the early war, the Soviets have sought to improve their conven-
phases of a war. They estimate that the United States tional force capabilities. Since the late 1960s they have
could quickly augment the tactical air forces in significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery,
Europe and deploy as many as four additional aircraft armed helicopters, and air defenses. They have been
carriers to the European theater. They are extremely*-equipping their tactical air forces with aircraft possess-
conservative in evaluating NATO's combat potential ing increased performance and load-carrying capacity.
During this period the flexibility and conventional war
and sometimes ascribe exaggerated capabilities to potential of Soviet naval forces also have been marked-
NATO.poetaofSvenaafocsashaebemakd ly improved by the acquistition of more capable
34. The Soviets view NATO's nuclear arsenal as the surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships,
primary threat to Warsaw Pact forces. They credit replenishment ships, and aircraft.
NATO with a large inventory of nuclear weapons and 38. The increase in conventional firepower in the
delivery systems which include various types of air- ground and air forces has especially enhanced the
craft, artillery, and tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Pact's ability to overcome organized NATO defenses
They appreciate that the mobility, survivability, and in the absence of the nuclear strikes which formerly
flexibility of these systems make them difficult to were relied upon to blast holes for the passage of
combat effectively. They see a continuing trend to- armored striking forces in the opening phase of a
European var. Pact
ward the modernization and improvement of these stress the special importance of artillery in the break-
weapon systems. They have grave concerns about through phase when a nuclear strike is not employed
development of the cruise missile with its potential for initially. The added firepower also increases the Pact's
significantly increasing NATO's nuclear strike capabi- capability to destroy NATO's nuclear delivery systems
lity. They are also concerned about the enhanced and warhead stockpiles during a conventional phase,
radiation warhead which they contend will lower the which is emphasized in Soviet tactical doctrine.
nuclear threshold in Europe.
e t39. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to
35. Areas in which the Soviets consider NATO increase the size of their theater nuclear forces and
significant improve their flexibility. Since the early 1970s they
include the impressive and improving capabilities of have introduced nuclear artillery systems, increased
incd ttheir surface-to-surface tactical missile launchers in
NATO's antitank defenses and the continuing modern- Central Europe, assigned nuclear missions to addition-
ization of NATO's tactical air forces. These factors are al tactical aviation units, and are deploying a new
assessed by the Soviets as having substantially im- generation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
proved NATO's conventional forces, although they a new bomber. The Soviet Navy has also added
still believe that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces systems which improve its capability to wage theater
have made relatively more progress in improving their nuclear war.
overall conventional capabilities. 40. At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval forces on NATO's flanks in the Mediter-
ranean and elsewhere since the late 1960s also have
of NATO's navies, particularly the carrier strike implications for the Pact's potential strategies for
forces, ballistic missile and antisubmarine submarines, conflict in the European theater. Those Soviet naval
and amphibious assault forces. They see geography as units which are continuously deployed forward on the
favoring NATO's naval power. The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either
broad range of missions and capabilities to NATO's a conventional or theater nuclear context, especially at
fleets in either a conventional or nuclear war, the most the outset of hostilities.
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